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In the post World War II era, one of the prevailing trends characterizing 
US military, especially US Air Force, operations has been the heavy emphasis 
placed on overwhelming military strength and technologies. Supported by recent 
successes in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq the US now appears to accept 
superior military strength as the standard, relying increasingly more on such 
sophisticated weaponry as the joint direct attack munitions (JDAM), TLAM, 
CALCM, and numerous other guided weapons. Reliance on precision guided 
munitions, in combination with advanced technology, has in turn led the US Air 
Force to measure airpower success by counting the total numbers of sorties 
flown and tonnage of ordnance employed versus assessing the effects that were 
achieved and the goals obtained. Unfortunately, no matter how accurate these 
"smart" weapon systems have become, without the benefit of a "smart" targeting 
process to identify the best means to employ these high tech solutions, the 
tremendous advantages they offer quickly become irrelevant. Targeting is a 
concept that is inextricably bound to the very concept of airpower itself, and as 
such has existed since the earliest days of military aviation. Targeting is the very 
process that defines airpower. Indeed, without a concept of targeting, the 
concept of airpower loses all meaning. Currently, the Air Force lacks an 
overarching vision for determining how the targeting process and those that 
perform this vital military function should fit into the larger Air Force architecture. 
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From the first Gulf War in 1991 to the second Gulf War in 2003, volumes 
have been written about the successful application of airpower. Many authors 
have emphasized how precision guided munitions in combination with stealth 
platforms have altered the nature of warfare and they describe how the US has 
increasingly chosen to measure airpower success by counting the total numbers 
of sorties flown and tonnage of ordnance employed. While the sheer numbers of 
munitions employed and the ever-increasing accuracy of weapons is surely 
impressive, these statistics mask a more critical lesson--the importance of the 
targeting process itself. What good is all of this precision and technology if there 
is no investment made concerning the personnel and processes responsible for 
selecting the targets and the manner in which airpower will be applied? 
Not only have many failed to address the significance of targeting, they 
have also failed to comprehend the extent to which greater precision requires 
even greater and more detailed target analysis. As we transition from one conflict 
to the next, we witness our weapons accuracy grow exponentially. In the past 
decade alone, we have gone from a single aircraft able to drop laser-guided 
munitions into the ventilation shaft of a single target on a clear moonless night to 
a stealth bomber striking within just a few feet of sixteen separate targets during 
a single pass, under adverse weather conditions. While the press, academics, 
and many military personnel tend to evaluate operational success based on the 
sheer numbers of combat sorties generated and targets destroyed, few 
understand that there exists a select group of forgotten individuals with the most 
vital of job skills, responsible for selecting the best targets and munitions in an 
effort to achieve the operational objectives for military campaigns. Located deep 
in the bowels of various headquarter elements and scattered throughout various 
operational units, resides a group of 18-28 year-old soldiers, sailors, and airmen 
who have as much of an impact on national security strategy as many diplomats  
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do. Unfortunately, given the awesome power and responsibility that these young 
military professionals bear, few truly understand their roles and impact on military 
operations and national strategy.  
In the previous fifty or so years, the United States has had the luxury of 
overwhelming strength, allowing the US to seldom engage an enemy without 
having the advantage in combat power and technology. With numerical 
superiority across the board and a clear qualitative edge in equipment, the 
outcome of recent military operations has never been left in any doubt. 
Overwhelming force, however, can cloud deeper deficiencies lurking within the 
larger system that may not become apparent until overwhelming force is no 
longer available. By failing to critically analyze the processes that define US 
military power and by failing to implement corrective actions when required, 
overwhelming force may quickly become the wrong solution for the future 
application of US military operations.  
In recent years within the Air Force, several new buzzwords closely 
related to targeting have grown in importance – for instance, effects based 
operations, information operations, and intelligence preparation of the 
battlespace to name a few.  The result of this infusion of ideas and terminology 
has led to a confused environment of conceptual overlap where by the concept of 
targeting has been allowed to atrophy and an extremely critical discipline within 
the US Air Force has been allowed to wither. Targeting is a concept that is 
inextricably bound to the very concept of airpower itself, and as such has existed 
since the earliest days of military aviation. Targeting is the very process that 
defines airpower. Indeed, without a concept of targeting, the concept of airpower 
loses all meaning. Without an effective targeting process, all the US Air Force 
possesses is the world’s largest most elaborate air show. Regardless of how 
history ultimately records the merits of Air Force operations up until this point, 
one thing seems abundantly clear: the stakes riding on the targeting process and 
those responsible for targeting are as high as they have ever been and the 
deficiencies in today’s targeting process should no longer be overlooked. 
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The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to expose the recurring 
deficiencies that reside within Air Force targeting. This thesis seeks to identify the 
major targeting failures that continue to hamper Air Force operations and to 
expose the associated causes of these deficiencies. To do this, Chapter II 
presents the reasoning behind having a targeting process and then goes on to 
describe in detail the joint targeting process as it is presented in Joint Publication 
3-60. The goal of Chapter II is to highlight for the reader the significance of the 
targeting process not only effective Air Force operations, but for military 
operations as a whole. In addition to the overall importance of the targeting 
process, I also hope to illustrate the immense role those who perform targeting 
play throughout the Air Force when it comes to the success or failure of military 
operations. Chapter III examines the rise and fall of the targeting concept. In this 
chapter I will examine the Air Force’s short history and the various levels of 
attention granted to the concept of targeting by the Air Force since the 
introduction of aircraft to warfare. Chapter III will reveal how the US Air Force has 
at various times embraced and institutionalized the concept of targeting, only to 
later dismiss its vital importance, in turn leading to problems at the outset of a 
number of conflicts. Chapter IV scrutinizes the present-day attitudes concerning 
Air Force targeting and explains how the Air Force intelligence community initially 
became the focal point for targeting. In addition, in this chapter I examine how 
and why the Air Force intelligence community permitted Air Force targeting to 
deteriorate. This chapter will also review some of the factors that currently are 
holding back the advancement of Air Force targeting and I will consider what 
might be done to improve the targeting process. Finally, Chapter V will identify 
future trends that likely will have a dramatic impact on the targeting community. 
In this final chapter I will also present what I feel are some potential solutions to 
the problems associated with Air Force targeting and what should be done to Air 
Force targeting to allow the Air Force to become more effective and lethal in 





















II. ESSENCE OF TARGETING 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In recent years within the Air Force, several new buzzwords related to the 
concept of targeting have grown in importance – for instance, effects based 
operations, information operations, and intelligence preparation of the 
battlespace, to name a few.  The result of this infusion of ideas and terminology 
has led to a confused environment of conceptual overlap where by the concept of 
targeting has been allowed to atrophy and an extremely critical discipline within 
the US Air Force has been allowed to wither. Therefore, to lay the proper 
foundations for the remainder of this thesis it is necessary that I present what 
current military doctrine states in regards to the concept of targeting. 
 
B. TARGETING DEFINED 
Since the prevailing mission of the US Air Force is to direct force against 
military targets, I was more than a little dismayed to discover after reviewing the 
glossaries of Air Force Doctrine Documents 2-0 and 2-1 that there exists no 
definition of the word targeting. How could a process at the very core of the Air 
Force's mission fail to find itself mentioned in the pages of its cornerstone 
documents? It was not until reviewing AFDD 2-5.2 “Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance Operations”, that I found a single page of text devoted to 
targeting and a definition of targeting copied from Joint Publication 1-02 which 
defines targeting as: “The process of selecting targets and matching the 
appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and 
capabilities” (p.80, 1999).  Major Matt Mc Keon in his School of Advanced 
Aerospace Studies thesis entitled, “Joint Targeting: What’s still Broke”, uses a 
mixture of definitions from JP 1-02 and JP 3-60 to expand upon this very general 
definition of targeting. According to Major Mc Keon’s definition targeting is,   
the analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander’s 
mission, objectives and capabilities at the commander’s disposal, to 
identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will 
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accomplish the commander’s purpose through delaying, disrupting, 
disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the 
enemy (p. 6, 1999).  
While such a concept of targeting is not firmly incorporated into Air Force 
doctrine, Air Force Pamphlet 14-210 does fill some of the void in Air Force 
targeting. Although there seems to be an implicit understanding of targeting’s 
purpose, the fact that the Air Force has no doctrine devoted to targeting should 
be a matter on concern and will be addressed in depth in the latter pages of this 
thesis. 
Essentially, targeting is a methodology that incorporates an understanding 
about current enemy behaviors with guidance from operational military planners, 
in turn translating national strategy into a coherent military campaign. Targeting 
matches the desired operational outcomes with inputs from intelligence and 
operations to identify the forces necessary to achieve the desired operational 
effects. Targeting, “spans not only nuclear, conventional, chemical, and non-
lethal force application, but can also include information warfare, space, and 
special operations” (AFPAM 14-210, p.7, 1998). Targeting is a core discipline 
intrinsic to all military services and military operations. Targeting occurs at every 
level of command and translates the operational commander’s objectives and 
guidance into synchronized military actions. From these various definitions of 
targeting, it becomes clear that those working within the process have 
considerable responsibility, but yet no service has a dedicated professional 
known as a targeteer. Instead of creating a specific career field dedicated to 
targeting, most services have opted to add additional training to select career 
fields to handle targeting billets. The current US Air Force Pamphlet 14-210 
defines a targeteer as:  
an experienced intelligence personnel trained in the specifics of 
targeting and knowledgeable about operations. Targeting 
professionals do not produce intelligence, but instead apply 
intelligence. In the same vein, they do not direct operations, but 
provide expertise to the staff to nominate and suggest targeting 
options for planning and implementation. (p.7, 1998) 
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While the concept of an individual targeting career field is the main 
motivator behind this thesis, the goal in this chapter is to point out just how much 
is riding on these individuals, regardless of whichever service or command they 
may originate from. The diagram below illustrates the realm between the 
operations and intelligence career fields where targeting currently resides.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Operations-Intelligence Intersection 
 
C. OPERATIONAL ART AND JOINT TARGETING 
The term “Operational Art” was coined by Red Army General-Major 
Alexander Andreevich Svechin (1878-1938) in reference to a third category of 
military intellect that fit between national strategy and military tactics.  Svechin 
described operational art as, “the bridge between tactics and strategy, i.e., the 
means by which the senior commander transformed a series of tactical 
successes into operational ‘bounds’ linked together by the commander’s intent 
and plan” (Mc Kercher and Hennessy, p.61, 1996).  Operational art should be 
thought of as the skillful employment of military forces to attain strategic national 
objectives within a given theater through the design, organization, integration, 
and conduct of theater strategies and campaigns. Operational art is the process  
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of achieving strategic aims through diligently combining the unique assets and 
capabilities of the joint force into a sound operational focus which echoes the 
earlier definitions of targeting. 
 
Figure 2.   From Pirnie and Gardiner, p.5 
 
The Department of Defense joint planning process, notably the joint 
targeting portion within it, is the executor of the operational art process, bringing 
together contributions from a wide variety of personnel from numerous 
disciplines. At the operational level, the joint targeting process seeks to align and 
unify all targeting activities for the theater commander, translating operational 
goals and objectives into a synchronized and integrated plan of action between 
the joint components. Ideally, joint targeting is a collaborative effort that 
harnesses expertise from the joint force and various national support agencies to 
ensure that targeting effects are congruent with theater objectives. Joint targeting 
is a team concept; joint targeting must incorporate the planning expertise and 
available resources from all components in order to achieve synergy in execution 
of military campaigns. In other words, every warfighting component must take an 
active role in the joint targeting process to ensure that its unique contributions to 
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the fight are fully and accurately incorporated into the joint military campaign.  In 
a paper entitled “Campaign Planning for the 21st Century”, the authors state that 
“targeting is the element at the very heart of operational art” (Pollack and 
Weaver, p.11, 2002). 
D. THE JOINT TARGETING PROCESS 
Targeting philosophy has evolved from trying to effectively manage a list 
of targets for sheer destruction to analyzing and selecting targets based on the 
effect that elimination of a given target will have on the battlefield. Our goal is to 
find and affect enemy targets that will ultimately lead to attainment of our political 
objectives. Yet, how do we logically link a target to the desired political 
objectives? The targeting process is an analytical, systematic approach that 
focuses targeting and intelligence efforts on supporting operational planning and 
facilitates force employment. To facilitate targeting operations, a six-step process 
has been established to assist in the orderly transition from determining what the 
campaign goals are to how those goals will be achieved and eventually to the 
measurement of campaign success. The targeting process provides a logical 
progression in the development of targeting recommendations. It proceeds from 
the definition of the problem to assessment of the solution, without favoring any 
particular weapon system, theater of operations, particular service, or 
functionality. 
The joint targeting cycle resembles an open-loop system that is meant to 
be adaptive and flexible while in use. To examine this logically, we should begin 
with those initial inputs into the process that drive all other later phases. “The 
most critical decision to be made in planning any campaign is the selection of its 
goal. If the campaign goal does not achieve the political objective for which the 
war is being fought … then the campaign will be a waste of effort” (McKercher 
and Hennessy, p.30, 1996). Having identified the desired end states or objectives 
of the campaign, the targeting specialist then determines how best to assimilate 
US force constraints and capabilities; as well as intelligence on enemy force 
disposition, into a set of operations designed to achieve the stated operational 
goals. Once the targeting specialist has evaluated these various inputs, he or she 
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then moves on to develop a list of potential targets and matches these targets to 
the various US capabilities, relative to the desired effect. Embedded within the 
joint targeting process is a series of feedback mechanisms that are used to 
evaluate the progress towards the attainment of campaign goals, as well as the 
success of military actions applied against the enemy targets and systems. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Targeting Overview 
 
 
The six-step process that has been established to assist in the orderly 
transition from determining what the campaign goals are to how those goals will 
be achieved. Although the Targeting Process may appear to be sequential, in 
11 
reality the process is bi-directional and iterative. Additionally, targeting specialists 
often perform several of the phases simultaneously. This should be evident as I 




Figure 4.   Joint Targeting Cycle 
 
 
1. Phase 1: Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent 
The objective is the first principle of war in joint doctrine; development and 
dissemination of objectives and guidance mark the first step in the targeting 
process and is arguably the most critical. Objectives and guidance define the 
purpose and scope for all targeting activities within the joint targeting cycle. As 
defined in JP 3-05.2, “The commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent is 
derived from strategic national objectives and policy and is translated into 
strategic theater objectives, guidance, and intent by the geographic combatant 
12 
commander” (p. I-26, 2000). National political objectives and strategy are fed into 
the military planning apparatus of the respective combatant commander and 
refined into military objectives, yielding targeting tasks that form the impetus for 
the joint targeting cycle. 
Objectives and guidance begin at the national level as broad concepts and 
should end as short-term, well-defined mission objectives at the appropriate 
command level. Objectives define an aim for the entire operational side of the 
war that will be in accordance with national interests. Objectives help form a 
basis for target analysis and provide both the justification for aim-point selection 
and the means to prioritize the targets. Objectives also aid in determining 
collection priorities and provide a focus for intelligence analysts, thus ensuring 
the optimal use of limited intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
resources. To be most effective in this regard, military objectives should be 
observable, measurable, attainable, and logically guide the targeting process to 
the desired end-state. In addition, objectives resolve target damage criteria, thus 
enabling planners to select the proper weapon, delivery platform, and execution 
method. A military operation that is subjected to such ill-defined objectives 
jeopardizes the joint targeting cycle and creates a high risk of mission failure. 
Guidance consists of the ground rules or policies that govern particular 
conditions related to the execution of operations. Command guidance provides 
the framework in which to achieve the objectives, to include establishing the 
force employment scope and restrictions. As JP 3-60 puts it, “Taken together, the 
objectives and guidance embody the commander’s intent for military operations, 
and their scope can range from very near term tactical situations to far reaching 
campaigns” (Pg II-1, 2002). Finally, this step establishes measures of 
effectiveness for the joint targeting cycle that ultimately dictates when the desired 
end-state has been achieved. Finding such measures is often one of the most 
problematic issues, simply because some aspects of Information and Special 
Operations do not lend themselves to easily quantifiable observations.  
13 
In the Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent phase, military 
planners are striving to turn national and theater strategies into a series of 
campaign tasks. This is the targeting phase in which the objectives of the various 
component commanders must be stated and instituted within the joint operational 
strategy. Failure to adequately represent component commander’s objectives 
and strategies will likely contribute to increased confusion and coordination 
anguish later in the targeting process. It is essential that all US military 
capabilities be tied together if a specific effect or objective is to be successfully 
achieved. Once the objective and tasks have clearly been articulated, the 
targeting process examines what actions need to be executed in order to secure 
the stated campaign objectives.  
2. Phase 2: Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and 
Prioritization 
Once the theater commander’s objectives are established and 
disseminated, the targeting specialist must analyze and determine what enemy 
behavior to influence in order to achieve a particular objective or effect. The 
overall intent of target development is to derive from the commander’s objectives 
and guidance a list of prioritized targets with associated aim-points and damage 
requirements. “Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization is 
the phase of the joint targeting process that analyzes target systems, their 
components, and elements in order to determine their significance and relevance 
based on the commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent” (JP 3-05.2, p. I-27, 
2000). Developing an efficient and effective targeting strategy requires vast 
amounts of detailed data accumulated by the U.S. intelligence community. 
Intelligence support in relation to the physical and virtual environments of the 
opposition is vital for this effective target analysis and to determine which targets 
are best suited to achieve the commander’s desired effects efficiently and 
rationally. Targeting specialists use a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
analyses to determine which targets are most likely to satisfy the commander’s 
objectives, and the specific nature, extent, and duration of damage that needs to 
be inflicted on those targets to reach the desired end state.  
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Target analysis is a systematic approach to determine enemy 
vulnerabilities and exploitable weaknesses. Target analysis determines what 
effects will likely be achieved against target systems and their associated 
activities. To perform target analysis, a targeting specialist must understand the 
physical, functional, and now virtual characteristics of systems and how these 
systems are interdependent and inter-linked. “Target development links these 
multiple target systems and their components in matrices that reflect both their 
intra- and inter- dependency with elements of tasks that, in the aggregate, 
contribute to the accomplishment of objectives” (JP 3-60, p. II-4, 2002). Target 
analysis provides the understanding for determining what effects are likely to be 
achieved by attacking elements within the enemy system, where the system 
must be attacked, and how long the attack will disrupt enemy plans or 
operations.  
Although his focus in Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, is on targeting 
support to Information Warfare, Gregory Rattray never the less considers target 
development to be one of the four conditions needed to successfully wage an 
effective information warfare campaign. According to Rattray: 
Actors considering the use of strategic warfare must be able to 
discern whether complex targeted systems of the adversary will 
prove robust and difficult to damage or consist of critical nodes that 
provide offensive forces with significant leverage in terms of 
creating damage and pain. Strategist must understand how 
damaged or destroyed targets within the adversary’s perceived 
centers of gravity will translate to political pressure. (Pg. 100, 2001) 
Target validation ensures that all nominated targets meet the 
commander’s objectives and adhere to guidance. Target validation also ensures 
that the chosen targets are indeed viable elements in the enemy system. Some 
of the key questions a targeting specialist should be able to answer during 
validation are: Do the targets meet Joint Force Commander (JFC) objectives and 
guidance? Does the target contribute to the adversary's capability and will to 
wage war? Is the target operational? Is the target significant? Is the target 
politically sensitive? What psychological impacts will operations against the 
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target have on the adversary? What are LOAC and ROE considerations? And 
what is the impact of not conducting operations against the target? (AFPAM 14-
210, p.51, 1998) 
Once validated, the targets are then prioritized and nominated for attack 
by the individual service or agency’s targeting representatives, through the joint 
fires processes of the respective component commander. The targeting specialist 
provides the commander, or his designated target approval representative, with a 
prioritized list of specific validated targets. This list is not a steadfast mandate for 
execution. Rather, the targeting list represents various options arranged 
according to relative importance, based on the characteristics of a certain phase 
of the campaign. “Target nominations should show how target recommendations 
satisfy command objectives and priorities. Additionally, planners should establish 
and justify options and priorities, and document these efforts before nominating 
target tasking to the commander” (AFPAM 14-210, p.54, 1998). Targets are 
prioritized based on the relative importance and prioritization of the commander’s 
objectives. Once the nominated targets have been approved by the theater 
commander, or his representative, the components involved in attacking these 
targets then assess what to use in accordance with the desired level of damage 
needed to satisfy the commander’s objectives within the bounds of established 
guidance. 
3. Phase 3: Capabilities Analysis 
Capabilities Analysis or Weaponeering Assessment, as it is referred to in 
AFPAM 14-210, is that phase which quantifies the expected results of non-lethal 
and lethal effects of a particular weapon or capability against the nominated 
target. The number one concern in this phase is to match the weapon that 
promises to inflict the type and extent of damage required with our understanding 
of where the target fits in the enemy’s system, and the effect we hope to attain. 
Weaponeering solutions do not predict the results of any specific weapon; 
weaponeering solutions give an estimate of the expected performance of a 
nominal weapon. Weaponeering uses probabilities and trend analyses, combined 
with quantitative data from empirical tests, actual combat results, and/or 
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engineering models. To optimize targeting solutions, weaponeering must be 
unconstrained but yet remain realistic avoiding any preconceived notions 
regarding a particular weapon. At the same time the targeteer must remain 
conscious of ordnance availability, enemy defenses, target vulnerabilities, and 
systems accuracy. 
The amount of force required to destroy the function of a particular target 
versus destroying the target structurally are not the same thing. Consequently, 
for lethal effects, a specific objective stating the desired level of damage is 
necessary to maximize the effectiveness of an attack. To achieve a specific level 
of damage, one must consider target vulnerability, weapons effects, delivery 
errors, weapon reliability, weapons system capabilities, and weapon quantities. 
Alternate weapons, weapons systems, and delivery tactics must likewise be 
considered. “It is an error of the first magnitude for the grand tactician to think 
solely in the terms of physical destruction” (Mc Kercher and Hennessy, p. 13, 
1996). Simply matching a target to a capability does not provide the complete 
solution. For instance, weaponeering assessments for non-lethal force 
applications typically can include Electronic Warfare, Information Operations, and 
Psychological Operations assets. These, however, often do not lend themselves 
to quantifiable observations. Thus, weaponeering assessments must be always 
alert to collateral damage issues at or near the target that could potentially violate 
the commander ’s guidance or other restrictions. In this case, weaponeering may 
reveal the need to seek amended guidance or dictate employment tactics to 
prevent costly mistakes. A targeting specialist has to now sync the required 
capability to the resources available within the theater of operations. 
4. Phase 4: Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment 
The Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment phase involves 
optimizing the available delivery platforms and weapons to the nominated targets 
in a mode that satisfies the aim of the commander’s objectives. The intent is not 
to reach a solution that favors a particular weapon, but to select the most 
appropriate "tool" to perform the job. To paraphrase a Russian proverb: "If all you 
have is a hammer, then all of your problems look like nails" (Atlantic Intel 
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Command, ND).  A targeting specialist must strive to eliminate bias toward a 
particular weapon or weapon system. The reality of scarce resources dictates 
that the required force must be balanced against logistical capabilities and 
operational realities. Therefore, the prioritized target list may not be implemented 
in the exact same order in which it appears. Force application blends the science 
of prioritizing targets with the art of campaign planning —it is the phase of the 
targeting process where the science and art of war coalesce. 
5. Phase 5: Mission Planning and Force Execution 
It might appear as though the targeting specialist would play a very limited 
role in the mission planning and force execution phase while the operators 
dominate it. In fact, all of the work of the targeting specialist eventually leads 
toward providing someone, somewhere, with essential information for execution 
planning and execution itself. Execution planning begins after the commander 
approves the force execution recommendations, and takes place at both the 
operational and tactical levels. This phase sees the detailed preparation of inputs 
to the Air Tasking Order (ATO), operations order, operations plans, and 
immediate target tasking. The targeting specialists still play a critical role by 
providing all the information subordinate units require, such as desired impact 
coordinates, weapon load-outs, weapon fusing, attack timing, and combat 
assessment preparation tasking. During the execution of operations themselves, 
the joint targeting cycle remains responsive. Targeting specialists remain on duty 
to respond to emerging time-sensitive-targets. Targeting priorities established in 
target development form the basis for responding to immediate high value 
targets. In concert with operations and intelligence personnel, targeting 
specialists work out swift, smart solutions and coordinate the diversion of assets, 
task alert assets, or pursue deliberate planning for follow-on missions depending 
on the priority. 
6. Phase 6: Combat Assessment 
The targeting process begins with the creation of objectives and 
terminates with the step that measures success in achieving those objectives. 
The value of any targeting strategy is lost without an effective assessment 
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process. Combat assessment encompasses combat operations, strike 
effectiveness, enemy repair and reconstitution capabilities, impact on enemy and 
reliability of friendly equipment-munitions-tactics. Combat assessment examines 
lethal and non-lethal strikes on the enemy targets and target systems to 
determine the effectiveness of operations. It answers the question: “How good a 
job are we doing and what is next?” (AFPAM14-210, p. 69, 1998) Combat 
assessment provides the commander with information about the status of the 
course of the war, helps formulate subsequent battle plans, serves as a 
benchmark for validating objectives, and collects valuable empirical data on 
weapon and weapon system performance. Combat assessment effectively 
"closes the loop" and re-initiates the joint targeting process. Joint Publication 3-
60 divides combat assessment into three interrelated components: Battle 
Damage Assessment, Munitions Effects Assessment, and Re-attack 
Recommendations. 
Battle damage assessment (BDA) is within itself divided into three 
analytical areas beginning with a micro level and later transitioning to the macro 
level assessment of effects. The focus of BDA is in the present; BDA evaluates 
the effectiveness of our targeting efforts against a predetermined objective as the 
conflict unfolds. The first phase of battle damage assessment begins with the 
specified target or a set of targets and focuses on physical damage committed as 
a result of an attack. AFPAM 14-210 defines physical damage assessment as, 
“an estimate of the extent of physical damage to a target based upon observed 
or interpreted damage” (p.71, 1998). The intent of physical damage assessment 
is to determine what effect the weapon had on the target’s physical structure. 
Results are typically presented as a quantitative percentage, but can also be 
depicted in descriptive terms. The functional damage assessment estimates the 
remaining functional or operational capability of a targeted facility or object. 
“Functional assessments are inferred from the assessed physical damage and 
include estimates of the recuperation or replacement time required for the target 
to resume normal operations” (AFPAM 14-210, p.71, 1998). Functional damage 
assessments are derived from the fusion of multiple intelligence sources, 
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including HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and open source. Targeting specialists then 
analyze this intelligence data and compare the original objective for the attack 
with the current status of the target to determine whether the objective has been 
met. The third and final component to battle damage assessment is a review of 
the status of the overall enemy target system identified for disruption. “Target 
system assessment is an estimate of the overall impact of force employment 
against an adversary target system” (AFPAM 14-210, p.72, 1998). Similar to 
functional damage assessments, functional damage intelligence reports are 
fused together to determine the overall impact on the targeted system’s 
capabilities and the consequent changes apparent in the enemy’s behavior. 
These measurements of effectiveness are then fed back into the targeting and 
campaign planning process for refinement of future objectives and targeting 
strategies.  
Complementary to BDA is the process of analyzing and providing 
performance feedback on munitions and their method of employment with the 
aim of improving future results. Munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), “is 
the function that weaponeers, engineers, and operators use to analyze the 
effectiveness of the munitions damage mechanisms and the delivery parameters” 
(AFPAM 14-210, p.73, 1998). MEA evaluates the effectiveness and reliability of a 
weapon by investigating delivery parameters, fusing, target characteristics, and 
reported BDA. MEA can be used to identify and correct weapons malfunctions 
immediately while hostilities are on-going or provide data for long-term weapon 
evaluation and development of new improvements. 
The cumulative damage to targets does not represent the total 
effectiveness of the operation because it cannot account for the assumed effects 
on enemy activities, the effectiveness of non-lethal force employment, or enemy 
alternative courses of action. Thus, the re-attack recommendation step is the 
final stage within combat assessment, when the need to continue the pursuit of 
operational goals and objectives is evaluated. “The purposes of this phase in the 
process are to determine degree of success in achieving objectives and 
formulate any required follow-up action” (JP 3-60, p.II-10, 2002). Re-attack 
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recommendations generally begin with an analysis of the previous actions 
directed against a particular target or target system.  If the established objective 
or desired effects were not accomplished, then the targeting specialist must re-
evaluate the aimpoint, tactic, and capability employed to determine if re-attack is 
needed. Targets that are validated for re-attack are recycled back into the 
targeting cycle. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Given the current trend towards a leaner force structure, the US armed 
forces are becoming ever more dependent upon precision munitions as a means 
to guarantee military success. While much has been invested in the pursuit of 
smarter, more efficient weapons, little has been done to guarantee that same 
level of efficiency is attained with those who are responsible for the employment 
of these various weapon systems. This means that no matter how accurate these 
precision systems have become, without the benefit of precise targeting 
specialists to identify the proper enemy targets, the tremendous advantages of 
these new weapons in war can quickly be wasted. 
At this point, only the external framework of the joint targeting process has 
been explored. The definitions and core concepts of the joint targeting process 
have been explained, but all of this thus far has been in theory. In reality, 
targeting is a thought process, not a series of checklists. In practice, the joint 
targeting cycle rarely flows as smoothly as it may appear in doctrine. When the 
fog of war starts to roll in, targeting specialists must be ready to tailor the current 
operational constraints, enemy behaviors, and available capabilities into an 
operational strategy that works to satisfy the desired end states of the theater 
commander and eventually the national command authority.  A line from John 
Glock’s “The Evolution Of Air Force Targeting” sums up the need for increased 
awareness of the joint targeting process fairly well: "target intelligence is the 
basic requirement because a Strategic Air Force is nothing more than a large 
collection of airplanes unless it has a clear conception of what to use its planes 
against" (NP, 1994). 
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III. THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF AIR FORCE TARGETING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is a popular phrase that tends to circulate within the military 
community that jokingly states, “If you don’t like the way it’s being done now, 
don’t worry, if you stay around long enough those changes will come back 
around.”   Although this is a joke often heard around the “water coolers” of Air 
Force offices, there is some truth to it. One aspect where this is prevalent is in 
the Air Force’s behavior and actions in regard to targeting. Thus, this chapter 
seeks to illustrate the various ideas and levels of regard given to the concept of 
targeting within the Air Force. To best accomplish this task, I will briefly review 
the attitudes and philosophy of some of the earliest airpower theorists. The goal 
will be to examine how their various targeting theories led to a separate discipline 
within the Air Force, only for it to be abandoned and their concepts forgotten and 
re-learned time and time again to the point that we are presently wondering what 
to make of what we currently consider - again - to be a “new” concept. 
Fortunately for the Air Force, there are many motivated officers in the mid-level 
service schools currently studying the subjects of effects based operations, 
precision engagement, centers of gravity analysis, and other such topics related 
to the targeting discipline. While it is rewarding to see these important topics 
being brought back into circulation, much of what is currently being written and 
published is nothing more than resuscitated ideas that have always been present 
and have long been relevant, but just simply ignored or forgotten by many within 
the service. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF TARGETING THEORY THROUGH WW II 
With the introduction of aircraft in World War I came no clear concept 
about how to best employ this new technology in warfare. Prior to World War I 
the objective of an army was to engage and defeat a fielded enemy as a means 
to gain control over the enemy’s seat of power and eventually control over the 
state. During World War I, early airpower theorists believed strategic 
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bombardment could be an instrument used to effectively bypass standing armies 
and navies to disrupt enemy supply and communication lines, severing fielded 
forces from home garrisons. Major Edgar S. Gorrell developed the first concept 
of strategic bombardment in November of 1918 and formulated that the best 
utilization for early airpower would be to "drop aerial bombs upon commercial 
centers and the lines of communications (LOC) in such quantities as will wreck 
the points aimed at and cut off the necessary supplies without which the armies 
in the field cannot exist” (Glock, NP, 1994,). Before Major Gorrell’s vision could 
take shape, WWI came to a close and it would require the further endorsement of 
other airpower advocates before his concept came to fruition. 
During the inter-war years, early airpower theorists General William 
Mitchell, General Hugh Trenchard, and Giulio Douhet began to advocate that 
airpower’s greatest strength did not lie in attacking an enemy’s fielded force 
directly, but in attacking those items that supported the enemy’s fielded forces. 
These ideologists theorized that aircraft could subvert the traditional force-on-
force engagements of large enemy armies and navies, especially if they 
concentrated their destructive abilities against the industrial, political, economic, 
and population centers of the enemy. As Colonel Phillip Meilinger in his article 
entitled “Air Targeting Strategies: An Overview”, states: 
Air doctrine in the United States and Britain during the interwar 
years focused on the enemy’s industrial infrastructure, not his 
population. In this view, the modern state was dependent on mass 
production of military goods… Moreover, most airmen took a 
broader view and argued that essentials such as electrical power, 
steel, chemicals and oil were the essential building blocks…needed 
to sustain the war effort.  (p.57, ND) 
 With airpower theorists now beginning to realize that the entire enemy 
nation was open to attack, the question for air theorists of the time progressed to: 
where it would be best to attack the enemy in order to achieve previously agreed 
upon strategic objectives? World War I reinforced the idea that successful 
application of air power requires a predetermined plan, calculated to destroy the 
enemy's will and war-sustaining capability. Achieving this goal required 
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systematic analysis to determine which targets, if destroyed, would inflict the 
greatest amount of damage to the enemy, thus making it “more incumbent upon 
airmen to become more familiar with the inner workings of an enemy nation than 
had ever been the case previously” (Meilinger, p.54, ND). In the early 1930s the 
Air Corps Tactical School Instructors began to “examine the possibility of a 
scientific study of a nation’s industry as a means to single out key targets and 
critical nodes whose destruction would halt an entire industry or series of 
industries” (Lindsay, p.27-28, 1993). 
To assess these targets, the Air Service needed a dedicated group of 
professionals equipped with the ability to collect and analyze information about 
the enemy and determine which targets, if destroyed, would do the most harm to 
potential enemies. An organization with a constant focus on air targeting would 
be required to undertake this kind of systematic study. This organization would 
need to maintain vast amounts of information about potential targets, as well as 
possess the ability to acquire and interpret a variety of target materials in order to 
translate this information into a series of effective air operations. 
In 1940, General Henry Arnold, then the Chief of the Army Air Corps, 
appointed Major Haywood S. Hansell the first chief of strategic air intelligence 
and analysis (the second highest air intelligence officer in the Air Corps). Major 
Hansell’s section “performed economic-industrial-social analyses…It analyzed 
and described the vital and vulnerable systems, selected targets, and prepared 
target folders“ (Glock, NP, 1994). Major Hansell soon discovered that his new 
intelligence responsibilities ran the gamut between two extremes. On one hand, 
Major Hansell needed to develop tactical level intelligence on items such as 
enemy troop strengths, disposition, and capabilities of enemy air and air defense 
forces. On the other hand, the idea of strategic bombardment levied an entirely 
new demand for a new type of intelligence. As Colonel Meilinger explains, 
“Because aircraft could now strike military, economic, and government centers 
deep within enemy territory, it became necessary to know the precise location 
and function of such targets” (p.68, ND). Major Hansell, in his memoirs states:  
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I believed foreign industrial analysis and targeting was the sine qua 
non of strategic air warfare. Without such intelligence and analysis 
there could be no rational planning for the application of airpower. 
Douhet's statement to [the] effect that the selection of objectives 
and targets was the essence of air strategy was patently true. 
(Hansell, p.22, 1986) 
Major Hansell soon discovered that this new application of intelligence 
could not accurately be addressed solely within military intelligence channels. 
Without the assistance from the Army G-2, Major Hansell set out to create a 
group of experts whose focus would be to dissect Germany’s industrial and 
economic systems. Due to the nature of the required intelligence and the lack of 
this knowledge within the established military network, Major Hansell hired 
civilian subject matter experts who already had extensive backgrounds as 
industrialists, economists, and engineers, with specific prior knowledge about 
Germany industry in particular. Using these subject matter experts, many of 
whom had been diplomatic or industrial attaches to Germany, along with open 
source information, scientific journals, and trade magazines that described 
various factory processes, Major Hansell’s group was able to establish 
comprehensive target system studies on Germany’s electrical, petroleum, and 
industrial systems. From our perspective today, Major Hansell and his group of 
subject matter experts were early targeting pioneers, and the first to conduct all-
source target system analysis and critical node analysis of enemy industrial 
infrastructure. 
At the outset of World War II, it appeared as if the Air Corps Tactical 
School and Major Hansell’s organization possessed a clear, well-developed 
doctrine on the employment of airpower against Germany. This doctrine, 
however, did not seem to translate easily to those on the front, and 
comprehensive targeting strategies generated by Major Hansell’s group of 
subject matter experts were not reaching the end user.  While ideas about 
“industrial web” and economic targeting were beginning to percolate up to the 
higher echelons of the Army Air Corps, the end users still had “inadequate 
intelligence to plan and conduct operations and lacked a systematic method for 
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selecting targets” (Glock, NP, 1994). One of the problems was that while Major 
Hansell’s group was able to acquire vast amounts of targeting information related 
to Germany, there was no pre-established system that allowed for the transfer 
and further analysis of this intelligence in the field.  
In an attempt to provide target intelligence to the operational user, General 
Arnold created the Committee of Operational Analysis (COA) in December 1942. 
This committee was now the focal point responsible for the collection, analysis, 
and dissemination of target-related information, to include the actual target 
selection for the bomber offensive against Germany. The COA evolved into the 
first “Joint Targeting Group” headed by the Deputy Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 
for Targeting. Eventually, the utility of air targeting intelligence was seen as so 
instrumental that in 1942 the Army Air Corps established a specialized school 
with the sole purpose of training air intelligence officers. 
As the experience of these early advocates of strategic bombardment and 
target analysis proved, the proper selection of vital targets was an essential 
component in the successful application of airpower. Accurate targeting analysis 
relies upon systematic analysis of expansive amounts of data, some of which 
falls outside the realm of “military intelligence”. The effective application of 
targeting “requires competent, trained personnel who understand the capabilities 
and limitations of intelligence as well as aerospace forces. These individuals 
must have access to a current base of knowledge and use it” (Glock, NP, 1994). 
After WWII, a survey was administered to assess the effectiveness of the allied 
bombing campaign. An assessment from the Strategic Bombing Survey found in 
Major Glock’s article not only remains applicable today, but should be paid 
significant attention by current leaders:  
If a comparable lack of [target] intelligence should exist at the start 
of a future national emergency, it might prove disastrous…The 
present shortage of trained and competent intelligence personnel 
give(s) cause for alarm and requires correction  (Glock, NP, 1994). 
World War II saw the first application and proof of the targeting concept. 
National strategy could be aligned with current operational reach and capabilities. 
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Subject matter experts from diverse sectors of industry and economy were 
effectively utilized, providing detailed, systematic analysis of enemy military, 
industrial, and political systems, and highlighting critical vulnerabilities of each. 
Technological studies of industry, weapons, weapons delivery systems, and 
enemy defenses required a comprehensive form of analysis, which had to be 
easily replicated and understood. To better ensure future continuity and 
capability, the Army Air Corps established a formal education program designed 
to develop and train military personnel to effectively combine target analysis with 
operational strategy to determine the most effective operational capability to 
affect the enemy. Then however, with the end of the war, many within the Army 
Air Corps began to question or doubt the need for targeting, Air intelligence 
shifted to indications and warnings rather than targeting. After all, why should the 
Army Air Corps expend time and expense on a capability if there was no war? 
Unfortunately, as we shall see this recurrent theme with those responsible for the 
up-keep of the targeting discipline. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF TARGETING POST WORLD WAR II 
In the aftermath of WWII, the Army Air Corps was left with a better 
appreciation for the role targeting could play in an operation. But then 
somewhere in the transition to a separate Air Force in 1947, and given a growing 
shift to use nuclear versus conventional weapons, the new Air Force lost sight of 
the value of target system analysis and those that perform it. The growing 
apprehension over nuclear conflict led many to believe targeting was no longer a 
required discipline since the overall objective instead would be to bomb entire 
cities versus select industrial sites.  With the mindset oriented towards massive 
nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in place, the USAF “did not possess the 
organization, intelligence personnel, data base, or target materials needed to 
support the application of aerospace forces on the Korean peninsula” (Glock, NP, 
1994).  
Consequently, at the beginning of the Korean conflict there was no 
established organization responsible for providing target analysis and materials 
on Korea. The Far East Air Forces (FEAF), the theater Air Force apparatus for 
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General Headquarters Far East Command (GHQ) run by General MacArthur, 
was the Air Force apparatus responsible for the Korean Peninsula, and its 
primary focus was on air defense within the theater. At the start of the conflict, 
FEAF owned 53 outdated target folders on facilities within North Korea. As cited 
in Major Glock’s article, the FEAF explained these targeting shortfalls: 
 
The probability of fighting in Korea largely had been overlooked in 
the years following WWII. As a result, we had practically no ready 
target intelligence…[We] found [ourselves] without a targeting 
system capable of fulfilling the requirements…However, an even 
more serious deficiency was the small amount of Korean targeting 
which had been accomplished… The latter stemmed from several 
basic causes, the most obvious of which was the small numbers of 
intelligence personnel who had been assigned to FEAF (NP, 1994). 
The report further states that the FEAF “lacked sufficient personnel to handle any 
large day-to-day quantity of targets” (Glock, NP, 1994). Worse, it indicated that 
there was such a shortage of intelligence personnel that many flying officers had 
to be placed in intelligence centers to support the war effort.  
Without a pre-established targeting program in place, the FEAF fell back 
on what it believed worked best and adopted a “cookie cutter” approach, applying 
the idea of industrial targeting that worked in WWII against Germany. The major 
problem with this was that Korea did not have the same level of war-sustaining 
industry or the same kind of manufacturing base as Germany or Japan. North 
Korea received much of its needed war materiel from outside suppliers that could 
not be targeted, making North Korea less vulnerable to the effects of strategic 
bombardment. This early emphasis on strategic bombardment tasking from 
Washington led the FEAF to be divided over the need to execute the strategic 
bombing campaign and the need to support events that were rapidly unfolding on 
the ground.  
 
In order to garner support from the Air Force and solve the differences 
over airpower priorities and target selection, General MacArthur took it upon 
himself to form a targeting group, separate from the FEAF, thus the targeting 
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effort could be used to support ground operations in Korea. In July 1950, the 
General Headquarters Target Group was established, consisting of mostly staff 
officers who “lacked the experience and depth of knowledge for targeting” 
(Griffith, NP, 1994). This lack of targeting experience was demonstrated in the 
fact that “out of 220 targets designed by the GHQ Target Group from 17 July to 2 
Aug, some 20 percent did not exist” (Futrell, NP, 1988). Much of this was due to 
the fact that the GHQ targeting group tried to pull targets from inaccurate maps. 
“This lack of expertise caused immediate problems because the target group was 
simply not capable of performing the required tasks. In three weeks, the JTG had 
angered all of the services with its inability to accomplish effective target 
selection” (Moeller, p.7, 1995).  
 
Due to the ineptitude of the GHQ Target Group, General MacArthur 
ultimately granted the FEAF a greater input concerning GHQ’s targeting efforts, 
with the understanding it would focus more air power on battlefield air interdiction 
and close air support missions. In time, the FEAF target section of General 
Stratemeyer’s staff picked up the entire air-targeting function, gaining full 
targeting authority in the summer of 1952. Eventually, The FEAF Target 
Committee “became the theater medium through which air campaigns were laid 
out against target systems in accordance with basic programs approved by 
General MacArthur and General Stratemeyer” (Moeller, p.8, 1995).  
  
The Korean War demonstrated that the US military was once again 
insufficiently prepared to conduct target system analysis and that there was no 
establishment or trained personnel prepared to conduct target analysis and 
selection. According to the FEAF’s own lessons learned:  
 
Although we failed to stockpile targeting materials on Korea prior to 
the outbreak of hostilities, a greater initial deficiency was a lack of a 
targeting system…Our hastily improvised program…suffered from a 
lack of trained and experienced intelligence officers…[This] resulted 
in a lack of sufficient enemy reaction studies, and an inability to 
provide complete weapon recommendations… The inability to 
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perform these vital targeting functions caused us to overestimate 
the results of several campaigns…Good target research must 
include physical vulnerability studies and weapons selection 
recommendations [and that] a truly effective targeting program 
must…be initiated before fighting starts (Glock, NP, 1994). 
Korea demonstrated, as did WWII, that there existed a need for a 
dedicated group of skilled personnel to be maintained, ready to provide target 
analysis and provide target nominations vital to the successful application of air 
power. To readdress the lack of attention paid to targeting during the Korean 
conflict, the Air Force did create “the targets officer career field in 1954” (Glock, 
NP, 1994). The Air Force was also appointed the executive agency for all 
targeting efforts within the Department of Defense. While I was unable to locate 
information on the extent to which these professional targeting officers were 
conventionally embedded and employed within the Air Force, there is evidence of 
targeteers and a targeting organization for nuclear planning. “17 August 1960 
when Secretary Gates established the Joint Strategic Target Planning Agency 
(JSTPA) and designated General Power as director, strategic target planning” 
(Futrell, p.588, 1971). Although the JSTPA was physically located at 
headquarters SAC due to the availability of equipment and personnel, it directly 
reported to the Joint Chiefs and had the responsibility of preparing integrated 
target plans for strategic (i.e., nuclear) operations. Despite the fact that the 
mentality of senior Air Force planners was geared mostly toward a nuclear 
exchange with the Soviet Union, the creation of a “targets officer” would suggest 
that once and for all the Air Force and the Department of Defense finally 
understood the need to cultivate this critical process.  
Unfortunately, this effort to create a level of corporate targeting knowledge 
during the late 1950s appears to have been noble, but wasted. In the early 1960s 
the Kennedy administration decided to re-align certain military disciplines under 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, leaving targeting to die once again.  According 
to Major General George Keegan, the 7th Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence in 1968-69, “Years ago, the mission of targeting was taken away 
from the Department of the Air Force and passed to the Defense Intelligence 
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Agency, where it simply died” (Glock, NP, 1994). This lack of regard for 
conventional targeting and those skilled at performing targeting functions once 
again proved to be a hindrance when we unexpectedly found ourselves 
preparing for war in Southeast Asia. 
When the Vietnam crisis began, the US Air Force faced many situations 
hauntingly similar to those of a decade prior. At the beginning of the Vietnam War 
there was no targeting apparatus in place and very little target development or 
materials available. Indeed, the theater had no targeting organization until the 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) director of intelligence 
established his own targeting organization, much as General MacArthur had set 
up the GHQ Target Group during the Korean War.  Also as happened in Korea, 
in Vietnam there were numerous organizations contributing to the targeting 
process, to include the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House. Without going 
into the political dynamics of the Vietnam War and the exact operational 
headaches that occurred, the one conclusion that should be apparent to anyone 
who examines targeting is that the Air Force was once again unprepared to 
support effective targeting operations. Ironically one positive lesson learned from 
Vietnam is that the Air Force at least “recognized that target intelligence is 
essential to aerospace operations” (Glock, NP, 1994) going so far as to dedicate 
sixty-three percent of intelligence doctrine to the subject of targeting. As Air 
Force Manual (AFM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations - Counter Air, Close Air 
Support, and Air Interdiction, 1969 states:  
The role of intelligence support in the effective employment of 
tactical air forces is of critical importance. Targeting is the key 
function and includes exploitation of all intelligence sources for 
target development, material production, target analysis, 
recommendations for strike and strike assessment. (Glock, NP, 
1994) 
 The lesson learned from the Vietnam War was that the Air Force finally 
recognized the targeting discipline to be an integral component in the successful 
application of air power. Mr. Calvin Hickey, a former Air Force target intelligence 
officer remembers that the big push during the early 1970s was for the Air Force 
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to break its habit of establishing “just in time” ad hoc targeting organizations and 
instead focus on the long term resolution of the targeting discipline (e-mail 
correspondence, June 2003). Mr. Jerry Wyant, another former target intelligence 
officer, informed me that the targeting career field was formally established in 
1974 “as a direct result of OSD-level lessons learned from the Vietnam conflict” 
(e-mail correspondence, June 2003). Calvin Hickey recalls, “I remember the big 
debate at the time was not whether to create a targeting discipline, but rather 
where to put it”. Mr. Hickey further noted that:  
The conundrum centered on the fact that although targeteers are a 
blended ops-intel-MC&G-JAG discipline, they work for the J3/J5, 
and would be the best folks to manage them. However, it was also 
recognized that targeteers, while not producers of intel, were heavy 
consumers of intel, and, given the intel propensity to hide behind 
the “green door”, that unless they were embedded in intel 
organizations, they would never get access to the critical feedstock 
for their work. 
In 1974 it was decided that while targeteers primarily worked for operations and 
plans personnel, the intelligence career field would be accountable for the 
management and fostering of this critical discipline. This new discipline was 
labeled with the 8086 Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) and the “Target 
Intelligence Officer” was officially born. 
With the recognition of the need for a targeting professional came the 
need to ensure these individuals had the diverse skill set needed to become 
effective target intelligence officers. In 1974 the Air Force established the Armed 
Forces Target Intelligence Training Course at Lowry AFB, Colorado.  This new 
targeting course was a four-month long academic pursuit that trained Army, 
Navy, and Air Force officers in the capabilities and limitations of joint weapon 
systems, and analytical methodologies for selecting, prioritizing, and 
recommending targets in accordance with commander’s objectives and 
guidance. 
In 1978, the Air Force expanded the targeting discipline and established 
an enlisted targeting career path known as AFSC 206X1 Target Intelligence 
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Specialist to “provide support and limited technical assistance to the officer 
corps” (Wyant, e-mail correspondence, June 2003).  Both Jerry Wyant and 
Calvin Hickey have very passionate views about the detrimental effects that the 
intelligence bureaucracy had on the targeting discipline. Both witnessed a degree 
of mismanagement and lack of targeting emphasis from senior intelligence 
officers, to the point that, in 1987, the career field was downgraded to AFSC 
8085, meaning that the senior rank for a targeteer would now peak at the 
Lieutenant Colonel versus full Colonel. To add insult to injury, when the targeting 
career field demonstrated its value and utility with an overwhelming application of 
targeting theory during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the intelligence 
bureaucracy persisted in eradicating the targeting discipline following the war. 
When the build-up for Desert Storm began in 1990, the Air Force finally 
possessed a targeting apparatus, while its investment in target intelligence 
training produced a strong cadre of experienced targeteers who had not existed 
in any of the previous conflicts discussed in this chapter. The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986-7 established a streamlined command structure with an emphasis on 
effective joint operations. The concept of the Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander (JFACC) emerged from this legislation, and with it came a single 
officer responsible for all airpower assets within a given theater. Within each Air 
Force theater component was a target intelligence branch whose sole purpose 
was to conduct target system analysis and develop target support materials on 
given countries within its respective area of responsibility, in accordance with 
objectives and guidance of the theater commander. In February 1990, seven 
months prior to the invasion of Kuwait, the Air Force component of US Central 
Command was tasked to update the air plan for Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1002-
90.  
In support of this request, the 9th Tactical Intelligence Squadron 
(TIS) Target Intelligence Division began target development for the 
draft OPLAN. Air Force targeting officers took the objectives that 
the air planners provided and identified target systems to meet  
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them. These targeting officers researched known installations and 
developed lists of potential targets. They used these lists to 
produce the Iraqi Target Study, which was published on 15 June 
1990. (Glock, NP, 1994) 
In early August 1990, General Norman Schwarzkopf, the theater 
commander for CENTCOM, held a series of meetings with Lieutenant General 
Chuck Horner, CENTAF Commander, on the status of the current air campaign 
plan for Iraq.  What General Horner presented was a principally defensive air 
plan that was generated by CENTAF planners and targeting personnel from the 
preceding review of OPLAN 1002-90. This defensive air plan consisted of a wide 
array of target sets focused against counter-air, interdiction, and close air support 
targets. Although this plan was available to initiate at the shortest notice, General 
Schwarzkopf sought an offensive attack option he referred to as a “Strategic Air 
Campaign Plan” in order to be able to inflict extensive damage on critical Iraqi 
infrastructure if Iraq pressed unexpectedly into Saudi Arabia.  
General Schwarzkopf’s request for a “Strategic Air Campaign” ultimately 
fell upon the USAF Vice Chief of Staff, General Mike Loh, on 7 August 1990. 
General Loh then directed the “Checkmate” division of the Air Staff, led by 
Colonel John Warden, to begin planning a strategic air campaign per General 
Schwarzkopf’s request. Colonel Warden organized a small contingent of air 
strategists, operators, and targeteers and developed the baseline strategic air 
campaign plan known as ‘Instant Thunder’. Instant Thunder was heavily 
influenced by classical strategic bombing doctrine, not too dissimilar from Major 
Hansell’s plan 50 years earlier, especially when it came to how to model an 
enemy’s centers of gravity in terms of five concentric rings which, if destroyed, 
would cause “strategic paralysis” of the enemy.  General Horner was reluctant to 
give over any portion of air campaign planning over to Washington, having 
witnessed the results of this type of planning during Vietnam. Thus, in a parallel 
effort, General Horner directed his own CENTAF planners and targeteers to 
begin developing the Air Tasking Order since he had no idea when an air attack 
might need to be implemented. 
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  On August 20th 1990, Colonel Warden, along with three of his associated 
planners, presented Instant Thunder to General Horner and his staff. Despite 
some personality and viewpoint differences, General Horner was impressed with 
the level of target system analysis, validation, and justification for striking various 
Iraqi target systems. The planners and targeteers at “Checkmate” were able to 
leverage the intelligence capabilities of the D.C. area; “they were able to 
assemble a much larger and more refined target list than was initially in Saudi 
Arabia “ (Clancy, p.258, 1999). Not entirely receptive to the initial plan, since it 
had not addressed the question of how to handle the thousands of Iraqi troops 
across the border, General Horner sent Colonel Warden back to D.C. while 
retaining the services of his three planners. 
General Horner then appointed Brigadier General Buster Glosson to head 
up the air campaign planning section in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, later to be known 
as the “Black Hole”.  Over the next five months, General Glosson’s planners and 
targeteers continued to perform target system analysis on Iraqi target systems, 
further refining and validating critical facilities and components. Targeteers 
continued to match up projected sorties, weapons systems, and weapons 
configurations against the target list.  Coming off of a relatively successful 
demonstration of the utility and influence that effective targeting can have on air 
operations, senior Air Force Intelligence leaders were, for whatever reasons 
about to shape the decline of the targeting career field for the next ten years. In 
1992, the Air Force Intelligence community merged and streamlined many “niche 
capabilities” in an attempt to better manage costs and personnel. While, from the 
outside, this merger of targeting and air analysis appeared to be effective, it 
actually became the catalyst for the slow extinction of targeting expertise within 
the Air Force. The effects of this re-alignment and the current status of the Air 
Force targeting discipline will be the focus of discussion in the following chapter. 
 
D.  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate the varying levels of 
commitment the Air Force has given to the concept of targeting.  I have shown 
35 
that the Air Force, at assorted moments throughout its history’ has recognized 
and institutionalized the concept of targeting, only to allow it to wither on the vine 
during times of relative peace, and become non-existent until suddenly needed 
again. For instance, the lessons learned during the Vietnam War helped 
formalize targeting by creating a specific career field and training apparatus to 
grow and nurture individuals with this skill set. But then, oddly enough, the 
operators and planners who depended so much on the credibility and experience 
of these targeteers took no responsibility for their existence. That responsibility 
was given instead to the Air Force Intelligence bureaucracy.  Then, during this 
next twenty-year period, Air Force Intelligence leaders made some inexcusable 
decisions in which they forgot the fundamental purpose of Air Force Intelligence: 
that is, to support airpower planning and execution. Target intelligence is 
arguably closer to the heart of the Air Force’s mission that any other intelligence 
discipline. Even after the glowing reviews that the targeting community received 
following Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force Intelligence leadership chose to 
somehow downplay the role of the targeteers, abolishing the 8085 AFSC, and 
shutting the door on the academic institution that supported this critical capability 
in September, 1992. Nothing is more central to airpower than targeting. This 
pattern of learning, but not acting upon them, represents a weak link in the 
effective application of airpower and will likely pose an operational risk in the 
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IV. AIR FORCE TARGETING TODAY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter attempted to illustrate the on-again, off-again 
commitment the Air Force has made to the targeting discipline. While in the past 
the Air Force held the belief that targeting was an integral component of 
airpower, the last decade has been one in which the Air Force has seemingly 
forgotten the pivotal role targeting plays in the effective application of airpower. 
Why has this been allowed to happen within the Air Force? Since Desert Storm, 
the US Air Force has been involved in five major combat operations and 
numerous limited cruise missile strikes. One would think the need for targeting 
specialists would appear just as, if not more critical, now than ever before. But 
while the Air Force has not entirely ignored the role targeting plays in the 
successful application of airpower, targeting has been allowed to languish. This 
diminishing of the targeting discipline has in turn led to a confused picture 
regarding the role that targeting should play in air operations and has 
marginalized those who possess or desire to possess this specific skill set. This 
marginalization has not come without a price. In recent conflicts, though the costs 
cannot be measured in lost pilots, aircrews, or mission failures, they have been 
felt in terms of lost opportunities to demonstrate to our adversaries the full 
potential of American airpower. Our lack of commitment to the targeting process 
has also led to errors that have been directly responsible for negatively 
influencing national policy. A 2000 report to Congress on the after-effects of 
Operation Allied Force states that, “The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade was entirely unintended. It was the result of a failure in the process of 
identifying and validating proposed targets. The headquarters of the Yugoslav 
Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement (FDSP) was a legitimate military 
target, but the technique used to locate it was severely flawed” (DOD, p. XX, 
2000). Unfortunately, the mistaken strike on the Chinese embassy is not the only  
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example of a recent error in the targeting process It is, however, one of the most 
prominent and when one examines the reach Air Force targeteers can have, 
suggests  why this issue should not be treated lightly within the Air Force. 
While over the last decade it may appear as if we are doing an effective 
job in targeting, this unfortunately is not the case. The targeting process today 
has eroded to a point that the ability to analyze and interpret the characteristics 
and value of targets, potential strategies, and effective force application 
recommendations has been reduced to simply adopting methods that depend on 
identifying targets in a database and checking them off a list, as if one were 
purchasing groceries on a trip to the supermarket. There is little to no 
examination of the overall impact not striking those targets may have in the 
pursuit of the commander’s objectives. As with the rest of this thesis, the chapter 
is not meant to attack those hard-working and dedicated professionals who are 
thrown into this extremely critical job without the support of the larger Air Force 
intelligence organization. Instead, its intent is to question the institutional lack of 
support being offered. This chapter begins by examining the actions that have 
been taken by the Air Force intelligence community and the impact these actions 
have had on the targeting discipline as a whole.  The second half of this chapter 
will present what I feel are some current policies that negatively impact the 
targeting process, specifically the lack of targeting doctrine, failed commitments 
to education, poor personnel management philosophies, and overall impacts on 
credibility.  
 
B. THE PURGING OF THE TARGETING DISCIPLINE 
In 1992, the Air Force intelligence community made the conscious 
decision to consolidate eight separate intelligence disciplines into three new Air 
Force Specialty Codes (AFSC).  There appears to be no single cause for this 
action, but rather a series of considerations that led to the AFSC merger. One 
reason for this intelligence reorganization was the mass downsizing and 
realignment of the military following Desert Storm. Consolidating eight separate 
AFSCs along with their individual education centers and management structures 
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would help streamline and save on costs. Another rationale for re-engineering 
the intelligence career field was to eliminate “niche capabilities” and increase the 
opportunities for career depth and promotion opportunities within Air Force 
intelligence. With the re-alignment of Air Force intelligence in 1992, three new 
and expansive AFSCs were established. Those who were formerly designated as 
8085 Target Intelligence officers were thrown into a pot along with general air 
intelligence analysts to become the newly designated 14N1B Intelligence 
Applications Officer AFSC. The Intelligence Applications Officer AFSC was 
designed to provide intelligence analysis and targeting support directly to the 
operational user.  Along with the consolidation of intelligence disciplines, came 
the consolidation of the education systems needed to foster this new AFSC and 
the closure of the schoolhouses previously used for basic AFSC training. In 
September 1992, the last class graduated from the four-month long Armed 
Forces Target Intelligence Training Course at Lowry AFB, Colorado and there 
would be no further formal targeting training for two years. 
The Air Force quickly realized that the merger of multiple disciplines into 
just a few created gaps in the training opportunities provided to intelligence 
personnel. As Major Greg Scrivner states in a presentation entitled “14N Force 
Development Way Ahead”, “Skills and knowledge that were effectively cut from 
our capabilities…for some of these skills, like targeting, we are still trying to 
manufacture a capability comparative to the days of old” (Scrivner, NP, 2003). 
This consolidation of training and the creation of a more generic intelligence 
officer placed an additional training burden on the gaining units that now had to 
guarantee that these new arrivals had the skill set needed to perform their duties. 
This “sink or swim” approach handicapped many of these generic intelligence 
officers, forcing them to adapt and learn by fire when thrown into the operational 
environment. The merger of the eight separate intelligence disciplines also 
eliminated the methods used to track and recall those personnel with previous 
specialized experiences, “AFSCs are the AF’s primary means of skill tracking. 
However, the decision was made to reduce stovepipes in our career field and 
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 thus the number of AFSCs. As we look for people with special experience now, 
there is no good methodology for tracking the intelligence warfighting skills” 
(Scrivner, NP, 2003).  
With the Air Force’s withdrawal from targeting between 1992 and 1994, 
the US Navy came forward and took the lead, essentially also taking the 
executive agent status away from the Air Force, which it had held on and off 
again since its creation in 1947. To fill the void left by the sudden closure of the 
four month-long Armed Forces Target Intelligence Training Course, the Navy 
initiated the formation of a new five week Joint Targeting School (JTS) in 1994.  
Calvin Hickey recalls,  
The institution of JTS was established under the executive agency 
of Joint Staff (J8), and the curriculum was developed by a Tiger 
Team largely composed of USAF (active, reserve, and retired) 
targeteers.  The Navy's principal role in this whole process was to 
instigate the formulation of the school, because they got a 
comeuppance in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and were shocked to 
see the USAF abandon the discipline shortly thereafter... with the 
intent from the very outset that it was to be a joint school, NOT a 
Navy show (e-mail correspondence, June 2003). 
As a result of this sudden loss of control over the targeting process, the Air 
Force’s senior intelligence officer, Major General Minnihan, convened a training 
and education working group to address the degradation of targeting within Air 
Force intelligence and the actions required to re-constitute targeting within the Air 
Force. As Gary Thomas, a former Air Force targeteer and member of this original 
working group, describes it, the “motivation [for the working group] was to put a 
band aid on the big problem of the dwindling number of trained Air Force Targets 
Officers available and how to identify them without an AFSC” (personal 
correspondence, NP, Aug 2003).  
As a result of this targeting working group, Air Force intelligence 
concluded that targeting was an essential component of air operations and that it 
was essential to create a functional manager for Air Force targeting and establish 
a new targeting course aimed at mid-level officers and NCOs. This new course 
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was designed to provide the necessary skills needed to conduct targeting 
operations at the Air Operations Center (AOC) level.  In just three months time 
during 1995, Majors Phil Pratzner and Gary Thomas, along with Master Sargent 
Steve Jones, created a five week-long targeting course designed to fill the void of 
the once four month-long Armed Forces Target Intelligence Training Course lost 
in 1992. The Combat Targeting Course (CTC) was initially designed as a 
technical school, combining the fundamentals of targeting with hands-on 
application to provide a knowledge base to those going forward to fill key AOC 
and higher staff targeting functions. The CTC began its existence on a less than 
steady foundation since it was created by, and then placed under the control and 
direction of, the Air Education and Training Command (AETC). Those 
responsible for the basic intelligence courses at Goodfellow AFB, Texas were 
now responsible for the budgeting and management of CTC resources and 
personnel. This placement of a mid-level targeting training center under AETC 
rather than the Air Combat Command or Air Force Staff has proved increasingly 
problematic over time. From the beginning, the CTC has been over-tasked, 
under-funded, under-manned, and under-appreciated by those that control it. 
When the CTC began with its first class of 20 students in August of 1995, there 
were only three instructors responsible for not only teaching back-to-back 
classes of twenty students, but also developing course materials, instructing a 
weaponeering mobile training team, and teaching the targeting portion of the 
fundamental intelligence course. In contrast, the Joint Targeting School had a 
staff of eleven instructors and two administrative support personnel for three 
resident courses totaling six weeks and two short mobile training teams. The 
CTC, meanwhile, went virtually unchanged with the exception of adding a second 
parallel session.  
Then in 1998, Air Force Intelligence once again felt that intelligence 
officers were becoming too specialized, and made the decision to merge the 
three remaining AFSCs established in 1992 into one new 14N1 “Air Force 
Intelligence Officer” AFSC. Although having three AFSCs still left plenty of room 
for movement and cross-training, the persisting concern among senior 
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intelligence personnel was that officers were still too specialized, which in turn 
put their opportunities for promotion at risk. A major assumption that influenced 
this decision was the idea that since the enlisted force was not as affected by 
specialization as officers, enlisted personnel could become the specialists and 
thus be the repository for continuity and experience. This form of reasoning - 
which persists - remains flawed on several counts. First, it assumes that all 
enlisted personnel are willing to accept some additional level of responsibility 
without additional compensation. Second, it assumes that senior officers in a joint 
environment, such as the Air Operations Center, would provide enlisted 
specialists the same level of credibility as they would another officer. Having 
worked with officers from other services within an AOC environment, it is clear to 
me that they often tend to disregard enlisted comments no matter how many 
years enlisted personnel may have spent in their respective specialty. Finally, 
this notion of generalist is also flawed because it assumes that every intelligence 
officer has aspirations to make Colonel.  In recent years this has become a rather 
hot topic among my mid-level peers. While some do indeed have the ambition to 
wear eagles on their shoulders, not all do. Many echo the idea that we should 
maintain specialist officers, and would be willing to risk ending their careers as 
Majors or Lieutenant Colonels in order to see this option enacted. 
The consolidation into one AFSC for intelligence also led to another 
consolidation of an extremely broad and limited fundamental intelligence course. 
The merger into one AFSC meant that Air Force Intelligence had one 
standardized course to cover the enormous spectrum of Air Force Intelligence. 
Not only did this new course have to cover an excessive amount of information, it 
had to do so in the relatively short time span of seven months. This condensed 
and fast-paced training regimen left graduates with an extremely wide view of 
intelligence, but never a solid footing in any particular aspect that they would be 
required to demonstrate when they drove out the gates of Goodfellow AFB. This, 
again, placed an additional burden on the gaining units and placed a heavy load 
on the shoulders of those fledgling intelligence officers who would have to learn 
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by fire. The effects of this new personnel and training system are perhaps best 
spelled out in Major Scrivner’s previously cited presentation: 
Greater burden on the field translated into more OJT, but as these 
transitions were occurring, the Cold War had ended and 
newer/greater demands were being placed on our force. This 
meant we had less people, less training, new missions, more 
diverse threats, and higher OPS/PERSTEMPO. This equated to 
fewer opportunities for internal training and a force that sank or 
swam by their own volition…This approach definitely decreased the 
quality of officer produced for at least 6-12 months during the 
transition between courses. It also reduced the amount of actual 
skills training delivered to our force. (NP, 2003) 
In August 2003, I contacted Goodfellow AFB to inquire about how much 
time was devoted to targeting in the new basic intelligence course. What I found 
was that those intelligence officers who were being sent out to fill targeting billets 
at the wing or the AOC, received only eleven days of targeting training. This is 
not enough, as is clear since every individual selected to fill a targeting billet then 
has to attend the Combat Targeting Course (CTC) to acquire those critical skills 
needed to perform his/her duties. Not only does this place a heavy burden on 
those graduates who are required to hit the ground running as soon as they 
graduate from the CTC, it also places greater demands on the CTC itself. The 
CTC was never designed to be a basic course. The CTC was originally designed 
as a mid-level course for mid-level officers and enlisted personnel, not newly 
minted lieutenants and airmen with no operational background to bring to, and 
share with, the class. To accommodate a high throughput of students, however, 
the CTC was directed to modify its training standards and evaluation techniques 
to guarantee student graduation numbers. In order to meet the high demand for 
targeteers in the field, the Air Force Chief of Staff for Intelligence directed a 
training planning team in 1998 to address curriculum modifications and student 
capacity. What this team concluded was that individuals needed to receive more 
“hands on training” in applying those targeting skills before going out into the field 
as “mission ready” targeteers when they graduated from the course. This 
requirement for additional training meant the CTC would have to expand its 
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curriculum by two weeks, extending it from five to seven weeks in total training 
time. In addition to these new demands, Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force 
saw an increase in the number of students attending the CTC, and by 1999 the 
CTC had three simultaneous courses with roughly 36 students per training cycle, 
with little to no relief between graduating one class and starting another. In 
addition to the three courses in progress, the CTC also offered training for an 
eleven-day weaponeering mobile training team. 
While those within the intelligence community and Air Staff were 
increasingly endorsing targeting and the need to have trained targeteers on staff, 
this motivation did not translate to AETC and Goodfellow AFB. On my arrival in 
the summer of 1999 as an instructor at the Combat Targeting Course, the CTC 
had five instructors who not only taught four courses, but also had to develop and 
maintain course materials and tests, in addition to general course administration 
and scheduling. In the summer of 2000, a second targeting training planning 
team was tasked to address the current state of affairs within the targeting 
community.  During this second meeting, the CTC staff and field targeting 
representatives were directed by Air Staff to “think outside the box” and bring to 
the table a proposal about what it would take to create a complete “mission 
ready” targeteer right out of the school. We at the CTC took this opportunity to 
add depth to many of the subjects that we were unable to give sufficient attention 
due to limited time, and we proposed an additional three-week expansion of the 
course. The additional three weeks would have been used to provide increased 
hands-on training and to develop a series of exercises designed to simulate real 
world pressures and time lines. When the CTC submitted this proposal to the 
training manager for review, the reply was that the additional material was 
important and needed to be taught, but the CTC would have to do so in the 
seven weeks already allotted. Once again then, the narrow-minded attitudes of 
AETC subverted what the operational users in the field desired. I contacted the 
CTC course chief in August 2003 to inquire about the status of the newly revised 
course and the health of the CTC’s instructor staff. He informed me that the CTC 
had three qualified instructors to run three classes and a mobile training team, as 
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well as maintain the day-to-day administration of the course. In other words, 
fewer people are now being asked to do more with less. It does not take a human 
resources expert to recognize that the CTC is again being misunderstood by 
those who control it, and that extremely dedicated instructors are being stretched 
to their breaking points. What happens when these dedicated individuals realize 
they are being taken advantage of and their motivation to teach plummets? What 
kind of targeteers can we expect in the field if the very course that is designed to 
be the sole source of targeting education and mentorship is abused and allowed 
to deteriorate? 
Unfortunately, Air Force intelligence seams determined to continue the 
practice of creating “just in time targeteers”, choosing to solve the targeting 
problem by rapidly filling CTC chairs versus grooming a pool of qualified and 
experienced targeting specialists.  Ironically, a recent Air Force briefing would 
seem to call this practice into question: “Some positions require more depth of 
experience than others…it is not smart business. Bottom Line: focus on what the 
position really requires to accomplish the mission, rather than attempting to make 
all officers try to touch all core competencies” (Scrivner, NP, 2003).   
As of summer 2003, those responsible for Air Force Intelligence would 
seem to think a targeteer need be nothing more than a generic intelligence officer 
or enlisted troop who has attended a seven-week school on the very basic 
principles of targeting. There is currently no long-range plan for how to grow and 
foster a base of experienced targeteers. Some of the other specialized 
intelligence disciplines are awarded a “Special Experience Identifier” that is 
designed to track those with certain capabilities, so that they can be called on 
when needed. The Air Force intelligence community has made no such effort to 
do this for those with targeting experience, choosing instead to track targeteers 
by simply searching a database for those who have attended the course. No one 
seems to have thought about what might happen when the Air Force finds itself 
in need of a targeteer and selects an individual who may have attended the CTC 
in the past, but has never actually occupied a targeting position? The CTC very 
often has students pass through it who do not go on to fill targeting positions. At 
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the very least, someone should keep better track of which personnel attended 
what schools and ensure those that attend the course do go on to fill targeting 
billets.  
 
C.  CURRENT TARGETING ISSUES 
Given current practices, one would have to conclude that the Air Force is 
not sure whether targeting is a discipline, a concept, or even something that is 
entirely necessary.  Specifically, the  Air  Force  lacks  the  doctrine and mindset 
required to promote the level of regard needed for correcting Air Force targeting. 
This section takes a look at some of the current issues that are contributing to the 
demise of the targeting discipline and what can be done to alleviate this. 
1.  Doctrine 
One of the fundamental problems with Air Force targeting is the lack of 
coherent doctrine.  There is no single doctrine document covering the Air Force’s 
views on targeting and how targeting should be conducted. What one can expect 
to discover are numerous references to targeting scattered throughout various 
other doctrine documents. Yet, the Air Force has not explicitly defined the nature 
of targeting or the importance targeting has on the effective application of 
airpower. According to AFDD-1, “Air Force doctrine is meant to codify 
accumulated wisdom and provide a framework for the way we prepare for, plan, 
and conduct air and space operations” (AFDD-1, p.81, 1997). If targeting is a 
process used to plan and apply airpower, then why is there no doctrine to 
address how to best perform targeting operations? 
Currently, the Air Force possesses doctrine on supply procedures and 
public affairs. It comes as a shock to me that the Air Force has no established 
doctrine document that pulls together current Air Force beliefs regarding this 
time-honored discipline or encompassing lessons learned from previous conflicts. 
Not having an established framework from which to work deprives anyone 
dealing with the targeting process of a source of accumulated knowledge and 
guidance about how to carry out the targeting discipline. Luckily, the Joint 
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Community has recently published JP 3-60, a joint doctrine document on 
targeting.  Hopefully, this joint doctrine will force the Air Force to create its own 
doctrine document on targeting, which in turn will convey to those at the higher 
echelons the importance of targeting and where we are currently failing. Without 
the foundation that doctrine provides, what type of targeting infrastructure can we 
expect to build? Only once our foundation is strengthened can we begin to 
envision and build an effective targeting apparatus? 
 
2. Education 
I have already presented the numerous growing pains experienced by the 
Combat Targeting Course since its establishment in 1995. While the course and 
its staff have made exceptional efforts to keep current and provide a challenging 
educational opportunity for students, staff members have not been allowed to 
execute this program as effectively as they could. In my opinion, one of the 
greatest hindrances to the education of targeteers has been the subjugation of 
the Combat Targeting Course under the overarching AETC structure at 
Goodfellow AFB. The CTC was originally envisioned as a “graduate level” course 
designed to produce fully qualified mid-level officers and enlisted targeteers. The 
CTC, however, does not produce highly skilled targeting strategists, target 
analysts, weaponeering experts, or skilled technicians. The seven-week AETC 
course provides intelligence officers and enlisted personnel with just enough time 
to acquire only the most rudimentary targeting knowledge and skills, that 
themselves are barely enough to keep these individuals from being overwhelmed 
when they reach the theater. By placing the CTC under the control of those who 
are responsible for the basic intelligence course, methods and institutional 
checks effective in basic level courses have begun to creep in and impede what 
is supposedly a mid-level course. This includes the static lock-down of lesson 
plans, the all too frequent shuffling of mid-level experienced and qualified 
instructors into staff jobs, the inability to bring in guests participants, and the 
inability to recruit experienced targeteers willing to pass along their knowledge to 
the students. 
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AETC operates with stringent controls and excessive accountability. The 
systems in place are very effective for ensuring that courses are designed and 
executed in accordance with set training standards. While this may certainly be 
critical to maintaining basic training standards, it does not suit curriculums that 
are continuously evolving, as is targeting.  Targeting is a discipline in which there 
is a constant stream of incoming information, systems, and operational lessons 
to master. In the weaponeering process alone, there are constant advances in 
weapons and weaponeering calculation software. The static nature of AETC 
does not allow, and even punishes, those that try to update the curriculum. Even 
if a course change is approved, there is an extensive period of educational 
planning, development, and approval before new material is allowed to be 
presented to the students. This tedious process discourages any new information 
from going into the course, at least by official means. The Combat Targeting 
Course would be better served by an organization outside of AETC that could 
allow more freedom of maneuver within the course, similar to the environment 
that currently exists at the Joint Targeting School. 
Another problem at Goodfellow AFB has been the continuous shuffling of 
mid-level, experienced, and qualified instructors into staff jobs. Many of the 
instructors that volunteer to go to this sparse West Texas location do so with the 
presumption that they will be teaching. However, once there, these qualified and 
motivated individuals are yanked from instructional duty in order to fill flight 
commander and other associated staff jobs that have no bearing on targeting. In 
many cases, these individuals are tasked to fill staff positions while still 
occupying instructor billets, limiting any refill of the vacated position.  This is 
currently the situation in the Combat Targeting Course, where the course chief is 
pulled to be a flight commander while still occupying an instructor’s billet. This 
pull and plug mentality has led to many experienced qualified targeteers being 
pulled from the CTC classroom, only to be replaced by less experienced 
instructors. Not only does this affect the morale of the staff currently there, but 
word gets around and negatively impacts the ability to recruit experienced 
targeteers willing to share their knowledge and experiences. Consider the fact 
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that enlisted instructors currently at the CTC average approximately 15 years of 
some form of targeting experience, while officer instructors average about one 
year of targeting experience. 
In addition to the above structural and managerial problems associated 
with AETC and its effects on the Combat Targeting Course, the physical location 
of the CTC also presents problems. On those extremely rare occasions when the 
CTC can bring in operators to lecture to the classes, the experiences that they 
are able to share with the class are colossal.  Having operators stand in front of 
the students and validate everything that is being presented to them not only 
adds a degree of credibility to the targeting discipline, but also motivates the 
students to perform better. However, Goodfellow is just too remote and 
separated form the operational community to attract these guests. 
On closer examination, it is clear that the current targeting training 
curriculum does not produce the type of targeteers demanded by Air Force and 
Joint Force commanders.  To produce the intelligence personnel needed to carry 
out targeting duties at both the tactical and operational level, the Air Force should 
establish two separate targeting training courses. AETC and the current CTC 
structure would be best suited as a “basic” level targeting course, providing 
graduates with the fundamental targeting skills and applications to function when 
they arrive at various targeting billets. The demands for technical proficiency 
within the targeting community have outstripped the ability of most units to create 
these technical experts through OJT programs alone. Functions such as data 
base management, target analysis, weaponeering, geocoordinate point 
mensuration, and imagery analysis require extensive technical training which 
could be performed well by a tightly structured organization like AETC.  
The Air Force should then consider establishing a separate and truly 
“advanced” targeting school to fill the original requirement of the CTC - that is, a 
course for mid-level officers and NCOs filling AOC and various other targeting 
staff positions. This new advanced course should fall under the control and 
direction of those who plan and employ airpower. I recommend that this new 
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course fall under the direct control and administration of either Air Combat 
Command or even Air Staff. In addition to being run outside of AETC, it would 
also be better served by being located in close proximity to an operational 
location. If this advanced course were to be located at Hurlburt AFB or Eglin 
AFB, for example, not only would the course have access to experienced 
operators, but could also leverage the other targeting and AOC-related 
institutions in the area. This leverage could come in the form of guest presenters 
from numerous co-located organizations, such as the Command and Control 
Warrior and Information Operation Courses at Hurlburt AFB and the 
weaponeering program developers at Eglin AFB. Regardless of location, this 
course should be on a par with that of the fighter weapons school in its 
selectivity, academic rigor, and length. The principle objective of this advanced 
targeting course should be to create mid- to senior-level targeting specialists, 
highly knowledgeable in operational planning and the execution of airpower. 
Particular attention must be paid to the role of the targeteer in the development of 
air strategies and joint campaign planning.  Targeteers must have an in-depth 
understanding of how operational plans are developed and executed, and the 
central role targeting contributes to this process.  While this vision may be 
grandiose, I feel that the Air Force desperately needs a course of this type. This 
course would create professionals who could do far more than simply annihilate 
targets on a list, but think through the problem at hand to recommend the 
appropriate courses of action needed to achieve the end goal. If the Air Force 
can spend millions of dollars to teach someone how to fly an aircraft, could it not 
justify spending that same amount, or actually much less, to create a cadre of 
highly knowledgeable targeteers? Or to be more pointed about it, is it better for 
the Air Force to expend the dollars to make up for some potentially costly 
targeting errors in the next operation, or pay the cost now to ensure that 
politically devastating errors – like the bombing of the Chinese Embassy - are 




3.  Personnel Policies  
Another fundamental problem afflicting targeting is the fatally flawed 
officer career management philosophy that presumes every individual’s primary 
goal is to rise to higher ranks and levels of command. In the previous section I 
outlined how Air Force intelligence found itself heading down this rocky path of 
focusing so much on people and their careers that it neglected how best to 
handle the operational task at hand. Currently, there is a plague of careerism that 
has spread throughout the intelligence leadership. Careerism is not solely the 
fault of any given individual, but rather a combination of ambition on the part of 
some combined with the military’s “up or out” policy.  The “up or out” personnel 
system assumes that an officer must either be promoted vertically to a higher 
level of responsibility or, if unable to move up, must be forced out of the service. 
This mindset of an “up or out” personnel system “means officers are constantly 
trying to impress their immediate supervisors, and a ‘risk adverse and careerist’ 
environment is created” (Robinson, NP, 2002). In order to appear more 
promotable, people often must move from position to position in order to achieve 
the necessary experiences considered important for the next level of command. 
The Air Force has even gone so far as to institutionalize this process. During an 
officer’s yearly performance evaluation there is a newly established “career 
guidance” form that the commander completes to direct which jobs would be best 
for his or her subordinates and where that particular individual must go next in 
order to achieve the next rank, not what would best benefit the Air Force. Indeed, 
some commanders even go so far as to direct where individuals will be sent next 
in the name of “career progression”, regardless of the specific experiences and 
training that individual might be able to bring to the fight.  Air Force intelligence 
has embraced this career management philosophy to such an extent that one 
could say intelligence training and the personnel system have been re-shaped to 
accommodate careerism. In the previous section I outlined how Air Force 
intelligence went from eight separate disciplines to just one in less than a 
decade. The overall rationale for these mergers was to eliminate stovepipes or 
“niche capabilities” that the intelligence community assumed were hindering an 
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individual’s promotability. Air Force intelligence seemed to put aside the 
operational mission of intelligence in favor of having more people stay in and rise 
through the ranks.  
 Tellingly, whenever this subject is broached with anyone above the rank of 
Major, the counter-argument most often made is that a specialist cannot make a 
good manager or leader. Yet, the logic underlying this point of view assumes that 
those individuals who are allowed to become too specialized are incapable of 
commanding in areas outside of their specialty. Currently though, the Air Force 
Director of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, the very person who 
controls Air Force Intelligence, is an Air Force pilot. The fact that this position is 
being filled by a pilot versus an intelligence operator does not make the current 
AF/XOI any less able to manage the intelligence community than would be, say, 
a targeting specialist or an imagery analyst who has remained in a particular 
“niche” for a good portion of his or her career, minus the occasional cross flow 
into parallel disciplines. If we were to examine the definition of what a leader is 
we would likely find no standard answer. Never the less, most would probably 
agree that a leader is one who can best utilize and manage the tools and 
resources available to carry out a particular mission. This leader does not need 
to become an expert in what his or her troops do, but needs to be able to take 
care of these troops and employ them in the best possible manner available to 
accomplish the mission. Leadership is not something one gains by rotating 
through various intelligence disciplines. I think the Air Force Intelligence 
community would have much to gain by examining how the pilot community 
structures its personnel system.   
There is no better example of a specialist than a pilot. As an operator, he 
or she is trained to perform a specific task: to fly the plane and drop ordinance.  
He or she does this and eventually takes on positions of higher command, as 
flight lead, squadron commander, wing commander, etc. Pilots may have the 
opportunity to move into lateral staff and educational billets, but for the most part, 
they have the tendency to remain with a given platform. To draw the analogy to 
how intelligence manages personnel, imagine a young lieutenant being trained to 
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fly a fighter. At a certain point, it is suddenly deemed time for him to move and he 
is informed he will be sent to fly transport aircraft or bombers with no further 
training. This move would be made based solely on the notion that this career 
jump would somehow make him a better Joint Force Air Component Commander 
later in his career. I would wager that, if the Air Force did this to its pilots it would 
not only have a mutiny on its hands, but it would also be defying logic. Indeed, if 
the argument is that since pilots fly the planes and drop bombs they need to be 
proficient at their tasks, why wouldn’t this apply equally to the individuals who 
pick which targets, specific aimpoints, and weapon load-outs are needed in order 
for that pilot to be proficient, skilled, and accountable in his or her job? 
A joke that is not too uncommon among company grade intelligence 
officers is that Air Force intelligence has made us “jacks of all trades, and 
masters of none”. I cannot speak for all intelligence officers, but those whom I 
have interviewed have stated that this career management philosophy and the 
feeling of constantly being thrown into the fire has levied a heavy burden, directly 
causing many to separate from the service. Fortunately, there is growing interest 
within the Department of Defense and the Air Force specifically regarding the 
issue of generalists versus specialists. During the October 2002 Corona 
Conference, for instance, several studies were directed at this with the goal of 
analyzing the results and providing further direction during the February 2004 
conference. One of these studies is to examine,  
Rebuilding of the officer assignment system to give individuals 
more input and to stress career development as the top priority. 
Assignments would seek to broaden experiences of officers who 
aspire to command, but also give those who aren’t chasing a 
general’s star the chance to avoid staff and broadening 
assignments that take them out of their functional specialty  
(Trowbridge, NP, 2003). 
Something else that is being examined is a modification of the federal law 
establishing the “up or out” system, which has governed the management of 
military careers since World War II. As mentioned earlier, this outdated system 
forces officers out of the system after a certain amount of time in a given grade. 
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What is needed is a system that would place greater value on officers who are 
allowed to become proficient in their duties and choose to stay within their 
specialty. This logic would require a complete 180-degree culture change from 
the current career management philosophy. Modifying the system in this way 
could even have decisive benefits for those seeking positions of command. Nor 
would specialization necessarily have to mean stagnation. In the business world 
specialists may not be promoted if it means that they would have to give up 
exercising their special talent and become managers; an excellent computer 
programmer may, in fact, make an indifferent manager. Instead, the company 
can reward the specialists by increasing their salaries, giving them more 
challenging projects, and assigning them responsibilities whereby they impart 
their knowledge and experience to younger specialists. Even other nations - 
Norway for example - have adopted a horizontal promotion system in addition to 
the traditional vertical promotion system. The challenge for those who will be left 
to address this issue will be to determine the appropriate reward system for those 
who might choose to remain in a given specialty. While this topic could be the 
subject of numerous theses, the goal here is to simply address how the current 
career management philosophy negatively affects how the Air Force Intelligence 
community manages its personnel, particularly within targeting.  
4. Credibility 
Another topic worth considering is the impact of the lack of attention given 
to Air Force targeting on the Air Force targeting community’s credibility in the 
eyes of those it serves: Wing Commanders, AOC planners and strategists, and 
Joint Force Air Component Commanders. The credibility of targeteers will 
depend largely on what they bring with them in terms of knowledge and previous 
experiences. Currently, most targeteers, especially targeting officers, have 
limited knowledge and very little operational experience on which to build. A 
statement from AFPAM 14-210 paints a troublesome picture of what will likely 
take place if Air Force intelligence cannot improve this situation: “If targeteers 
don’t provide full targeting service, then other well meaning but under trained and 
ill experienced groups will step in and attempt to provide that which is perceived 
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to be missing” (AFPAM 14-210, p.41, 1998). If targeteers are supposed to be the 
experts who conduct all of those critical task that I laid out in Chapter II, without 
regard to any specific platforms or capabilities, what will happen if the planners 
and operators that targeteers work with suddenly lose faith in our chartered 
abilities?  The absence of trained and - more importantly - experienced 
targeteers in the various planning processes could conceivably allow various 
operational and platform biases to creep into the planning process, equating to 




By now I hope to have established that targeting is closer to the core of 
the Air Force mission than any other intelligence discipline. It would appear as if, 
while trying to establish a larger footing and place of prominence within the Air 
Force, Air Force intelligence has lost sight of its true purpose and commitment to 
targeting. It has tried to do targeting on the cheap. Fortunately, the Air Force has 
had the benefit of some highly motivated and enthusiastic personnel who have 
been able to accomplish much with very little support. Currently, Air Force 
intelligence is at a critical juncture. When we start treating people as if they are 
cogs in a machine, we should start to expect machine-like responses. The 
problem is targeting cannot be treated as a mechanistic problem or else all that 
we will become accustomed to are machine-like responses to a problem versus 
the ability of an experienced targeting specialist to fully scrutinize and present 
varied solutions to a given problem given the capabilities at hand. Having laid out 
some of the current issues impacting the targeting community and have alluded 
to some possible solutions to get Air Force targeting back to the forefront in this 
chapter.  The following chapter focuses on some of the trends I see heading our 
way in Air Force targeting, and I also propose some ideas about how we should 
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V.  FUTURE TARGETING TRENDS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The information trend shaping wars in the future will drive exponential 
advances in precision, intelligence, speed of communications, and mobility of our 
enemies. In turn, this will place a greater demand on precision target intelligence. 
To better confront this challenge the Air Force must overcome organizational 
biases, as well as, training, personnel, analytical, and production shortfalls. The 
increasing demands on the targeting community require the Air Force to take 
aggressive action in shaping, designing, and building the future of targeting. This 
chapter begins by examining some of the future trends that seem likely to have a 
dramatic impact on the targeting community, and how the targeting community 
should be prepared to address these future trends. The latter half of this chapter 
presents my assessment of the changes that the Air Force needs to pursue 
regarding the establishment of a larger, more robust targeting infrastructure 
within the Air Force. I will outline two proposals, ranging from a paradigm shift 
best case option of creating a separate targeting career field (circa 1974-1992) to 
how we might modify the targeting community given the current mindset and the 
restrictions already in place. 
B. FUTURE ENVIRONMENT 
Having presented a historical overview of targeting and then having 
reviewed the current state of targeting, here I turn to what we can expect of 
targeting in the future. The following are some areas or trends that are likely to 
increase the future need for targeting specialists.  
1.  Varied Levels of Warfare 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the operational environment in 
which the US must prepare to operate has become much more dynamic. In the 
past, targeting specialists could focus their attentions on a select few regional 
powers within a relatively stable environment. In that environment, the static 
nature of the current targeting process worked well and targeting efforts could be 
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focused on a fixed conventional enemy. However, today’s environment is fraught 
with numerous players that present a variety of threats, such as rogue states, 
terrorists, and criminal organizations. The types of conflict targeteers have been 
involved with range from large-scale conventional military engagements against 
Iraq, to pursuing fleeting, high-value, sub-state targets in Afghanistan.  The 
diverse nature of military engagements requires targeteers who are able to 
perform targeting duties across a wide spectrum of military operations. While 
targeting specialists need to be trained and prepared to focus on long, 
conventional types of conflict, they also need to be able to think in dynamic ways 
given the type of conflict we are currently engaged in, what can be described as 
mid- to low-intensity sub-state conflict.  
In high intensity conflicts it may be relatively easy for US intelligence 
assets to present a clear, coherent picture of the adversary’s forces and 
infrastructure, making it easier for targeteers to assess critical vulnerabilities and 
assist with strategies that will help achieve the commander’s intent. However, 
when conflicts involve sub-state actors that do not present themselves as openly 
as more conventional forces, it may be extremely difficult to distinguish friend 
from foe. Thus, while targeting a textbook, conventional enemy may not require 
the same degree of flexibility in a targeteer’s thought processes, targeting in a 
fluid and dynamic battlefield will likely require greater access to experience and 
wisdom not achievable in today’s climate that privileges career management and 
relies on just-in-time targeting production. 
2.  Increasing Role of Weapons Technology 
One of the more prominent trends in the Air Force is the mass investment 
in advances in weapons technology. Given the current push towards a leaner 
force structure, US forces are becoming ever more dependent upon precision-
guided munitions (PGMs) as a means to guarantee superior military strength in 
future conflict. Although PGMs have been a part of US weapons inventories 
since World War II, they have recently re-emerged as the centerpiece of a 
revolutionary style of modern warfare following their successful application in 
Operation Desert Storm. Since the first Gulf War precision-guided weapons have 
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played a growing role in military operations, “about 8% in Iraq, 30% in Kosovo, 
and 60% in Afghanistan” (Bowie,Haffa,Mullins, p.3-4, 2003). Another trend that 
parallels the increased use of PGMs is the increase in total number of weapon 
systems that can employ PGMs. In part, increased demand to employ PGMs can 
be explained as a consequence of their accuracy and effectiveness. For 
instance, an increasing percentage of PGMs can be delivered in adverse 
weather conditions, day or night, through the use of weapons guidance 
technology aided by the Global Positioning System (GPS).  
The first generation of precision-guided weapons, which I consider to be 
those that use laser or electro-optical sensors to acquire a target and guide 
munitions toward it, have been in existence since the Vietnam War. The overall 
accuracy associated with these weapons was in large part due to the ability of 
the aircrew to visually acquire and guide the weapon to the appropriate aimpoint. 
With the laser and electro-optical weapons, a clear line of sight was needed 
between the aircrew and the target, making target acquisition itself less effective 
and easily disrupted by cloud cover and smoke. After Operation Desert Strom the 
US Air Force accelerated the research and development of a low cost, all 
weather, day or night weapon system. Out of this development effort came the 
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), the highlight of Operation Allied Force and 
Enduring Freedom, as well as the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). 
While GPS weapon systems do not achieve the same level of accuracy as 
laser and electro-optical systems, they do provide a low-cost, “near-precision” 
capability that can be employed in virtually any weather condition short of a 
hurricane. While the utility of GPS weapons cannot be ignored, there is one 
critical piece to the success of GPS weapons that does routinely get ignored: that 
is, the role of the target intelligence specialist responsible for mensurating every 
geo-coordinate programmed into the weapons guidance system. With the arrival 
of GPS guided weapons, overall responsibility for guidance was taken out of the 
hands of the aircrew and placed on the desktops of numerous 18-25 year-old 
target intelligence personnel serving across the armed forces, from squadrons to 
numbered air forces. This is not to suggest that the final coordinate input to all 
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GPS weapons is executed by the targeting specialist, as some aircraft have the 
ability to acquire, update, and reprogram updated coordinates directly into the 
weapon for greater accuracy. However, with the growing trend of miniaturization 
within the US Air Force, there will be more GPS weapons tasked against targets 
and the task saturation of the aircrew to refine coordinates while approaching the 
target will likely lead to the employment of more GPS weapons based on the 
initial coordinate data given by the targeting intelligence specialists. The reliance 
of weapon systems on the input of targeting specialists will likely also grow as a 
consequence of further research and development of autonomous and standoff 
weapon systems. During my assignment with 12th Air Force at Davis Monthan 
AFB, I was tasked with working with the contractors of the new Joint Air to 
Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). The JASSM is a weapon system for which the 
target intelligence officer literally programs the weapon’s flight path from release 
point to impact. In addition to plotting the weapon’s path around enemy defenses, 
the targeteer will also be responsible for creating the terminal acquisition model 
for the weapon. The JASSM virtually eliminates the role of the aircrew, needing 
only to be delivered to a certain portion of airspace. As Colonel John Boyd puts 
it, “machines don’t fight wars, people do”. The increase in these various weapons 
technology only underscores Boyd’s point. In this case of the JASSM, it is not 
those in the plane who are essential to the success of the JASSM, but those who 
program the munitions the aircraft delivers. Our obsession with stealth 
technology and advanced weapons systems has made us forget about those 
responsible for employing the technologies that make these systems as effective 
as they are. The JDAM and JSOW are simply the explosive end of a much larger 
weapon system, and the JDAM and JSOW will only be as precise as are these 
individuals responsible for the selection and validation of each and every 
coordinate that gets programmed into the JDAM and JSOW. Indeed, due to this 
interdependency, the Air Force can no longer neglect the role and importance of 
trained and experienced targeting specialists. As accurate as these and other 
"smart" weapons systems have become, without the benefit of a "smart" targeting 
process to identify the proper enemy aimpoints, their tremendous advantages in 
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war can quickly be rendered irrelevant or worse, as we witnessed with the 
Chinese Embassy bombing. 
3.  Increasing CD Concerns 
Enemies that we will inevitably deal with in the near future will continue to 
leverage and exploit collateral damage as a result of US actions, in an attempt to 
undermine support for US operations at home and abroad, and in an effort to 
undermine coalition and allied support. The increased pressure to minimize 
collateral damage has had a dramatic impact on the ability to conduct resourceful 
and responsive targeting by encouraging senior US political and military leaders 
to assume greater oversight of the target selection and approval process. This in 
and of itself, however, is nothing new to targeting. Targeteers and various other 
US military planners have long taken extraordinary measures to minimize 
collateral damage and uphold the principles established by the Laws of Armed 
Conflict, even going so far as to self-impose restrictions to help minimize 
collateral damage. Unfortunately, mistakes can and often do happen in times of 
war as a result of the fast-paced, hectic nature of combat that generates what 
Clausewitz called the “Fog of War”.  As a result of this “Fog of War”, occasional 
collateral damage is inescapable. Unfortunately, even the occasional accident or 
mistake in target selection, identification, and approval eventually can lead to the 
death of non-combatants and the destruction of non-military facilities. These 
legitimate combat mistakes often lead to an over-reaction and the institution of 
stringent controls over the entire process, which then often contributes to the 
limitation, or restriction, of combat operations.  
For instance, during Operation Desert Storm, targeteers and military 
planners managed to avoid major incidents of collateral damage given the fact 
that thousands of air sorties were being flown against targets in Iraq. However, 
on 13 February 1991, an F-117 was tasked to strike the Al Firdos bunker in 
Baghdad, which was believed to be harboring Iraqi intelligence personnel. 
Unknown to the targeting planners at the time was the fact that the Al Firdos 
bunker not only harbored members of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, but also 
served as shelter to hundreds of civilians, who were inadvertently killed as a  
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result of this attack by the US. Iraq was quick to exploit this mistake, which 
eventually led to a change in the selection and approval process for any targets 
located within Baghdad.  
Concerns over coalition cohesion and the need to minimize collateral 
damage played a much larger role in Operation Allied Force than in any previous 
conflict.  From the outset, “the United States wanted to conduct strategic strikes 
to go after the heart of Milosevic’s power, while many European leaders wanted 
to avoid attacks that would severely damage Serbia” (Bowie,Haffa,Mullins, p.22, 
2003). US targeting and air planners theorized that delivering a strong, decisive 
series of air attacks against those critical targets that Milosevic needed in order 
to maintain and administer his attack against Kosovo would not only be effective 
in getting Milosevic to meet NATO demands, but also require less time and effort 
to accomplish NATO’s overall objectives. According to a RAND study, “pressures 
to avoid civilian casualties and unintended damage to nonmilitary structures were 
greater in Allied Force than in any other campaign involving US forces” 
(Bowie,Haffa,Mullins, p.22, 2003). This concern over collateral damage severely 
impacted the way targets were analyzed, weaponeered, and submitted for 
approval. In order to get a target on the strike list, each target needed to be 
individually assessed not only for its military value to the overall operation, but 
also for the probability of collateral damage. Almost every target required 
collateral damage assessments and body count estimates provided by a series 
of computer models that generated these for every possible weapon type, 
weapon setting, and attack parameter. Each model, as time consuming as it was 
to produce, had to be generated by the limited targeting staff, whose other 
responsibilities included target analysis, target selection, capabilities analysis, 
and battle damage assessment. These estimated collateral damage models, to 
include expected noncombatant body counts, were created and forwarded up the 
NATO and US chains of command via General Clark, and sometimes even 
directly to President Clinton, before approval would be given. Not only did this 
increased oversight slow down our ability to respond to changes in a timely  
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manner, but in some cases the targeteers were tasked to provide or even 
directed to use different ordinance, some of which would not be able to achieve 
the desired effect on the intended target.   
Given this pattern of increased caution and concern over the fall-out from 
collateral damage incidents, it would appear that targeting planners will need to 
be better able to respond to this in the future. Currently, targeteers are educated 
in the Laws of Armed Conflict and taught how to go about selecting targets in a 
manner congruent with these laws. But in order to maintain the speed and 
flexibility needed on the battlefields of the future, targeteers will have to be even 
more cognizant of the larger impacts of their recommendations and have the 
credibility needed to instill confidence in those that have to make decisions based 
on targeteers recommendations. In addition, targeteers will need to remain 
proficient in understanding the effects of given weapons against specific targets 
and be able to resoundingly prove to others that their weapon recommendations 
may be the only option available. Finally, targeteers will have to be well versed in 
various collateral damage modeling tools and have the freedom to continually 
practice and sharpen these skills. Like so many other aspects of targeting, 
collateral damage evaluation is a necessary skill that requires the targeteer to be 
highly credible, knowledgeable, proficient, and responsive - all of which are 
difficult given the limitations currently levied on those in the target intelligence 
discipline.   
4.  Increasing Speed of Tasks: 
Another prominent trend is the rapidly improving speed at which targets 
can be generated and prosecuted by a combination of battle management, 
sensor, and strike platforms, compressing what has become known as the “kill 
chain”.  Traditionally, most targeting was performed in an environment that was 
slower in pace, leading to the establishment of a 72-hour Air Tasking Order cycle 
that is officially still in effect today, according to AFI 13-1AOC. This increased 
deliberate planning period was a result of the technological limitations placed on 
intelligence collection and communication technologies critical in the 
commander’s approval and decision-making process. One problem with this 
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deliberate planning process from the Cold War is that it instills an institutional 
propensity for scripted and static military operations as opposed to the dynamic 
and fluid responses today’s military operations call for. Since Operation Desert 
Storm, not only have our potential enemies transitioned to a more dispersed, 
mobile force, but also the US technical ability to quickly acquire, assess, decide, 
process, disseminate, and act have greatly speed up. It seems safe to say that 
future battlefields will be equally nonlinear and will require renewed emphasis on 
both adaptive planning and dynamic military operations. With this shift in 
operating environments must likewise come a shift in the abilities of targeting 
specialists to adapt and become better prepared to confront these types of 
situations.  
The combined experiences of planners and operators in Desert 
Storm, Allied Force, and Enduring Freedom underscore this point. 
In the Gulf War, for example, 20% of targets were selected after 
aircraft launch, whereas over Kosovo, 43% of the targets were 
selected once the aircraft were airborne. In Afghanistan, 80% of the 
carrier-based sorties were launched without pre-designated targets 
(Bowie,Haffa,Mullins, p.3, 2003). 
Despite the various command and approval obstacles that confronted 
targeteers during Operation Allied Force, the kill chain cycle was greatly reduced 
from that during Desert Storm.  During Operation Desert Storm, it could take 
days from the moment of intelligence collection on a target to the actual strike on 
that target. During Operation Allied Force, this kill chain cycle had been severely 
reduced to just a few minutes in some select cases, and by Operation Enduring 
Freedom a few minutes were the norm. Targeteers and military planners working 
with numerous live data streams, while being directly linked with ISR platforms 
and numerous strike aircraft, re-shaped the targeting process and placed a 
greater responsibility on the targeting specialist. More often than not in the 
previous 72-hour cycle, targeteers had the luxury of conducting considerate 
analysis using various source materials available to them, to include calling upon 
specialists in various other intelligence organizations for assistance. With the 
shortening of the targeting process, targeteers will be required to make these 
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very important decisions without the luxury of “cheat sheets”. In point of fact, 
during the numerous AOC exercises that I have attended, the targeting shops 
always placed their “all star” targeteers on the Combat Operations Floor of the 
AOC. The Combat Operations Floor is that portion of the AOC responsible for 
mobile targeting, time critical targeting, time sensitive targeting, fleeting targets, 
high value targets, or whatever is the buzz word term at the time. Without 
question, the targeteer responsible on the Combat Operation floor needs to be 
well versed in every aspect of the targeting process. All of the skill sets required 
for targeting are utilized during this Combat Operations period; targeteers that 
are not well versed in all of the targeting niches do not serve the AOC effectively. 
If these high speed, dynamic environments represent the wave of targeting to 
come, then it stands to reason that every targeting specialist will need the ability, 
wisdom, and credibility to make these quick and accurate targeting decisions.  
 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TARGETING CHANGES 
In the previous section I have tried to enumerate some of the recurring 
themes and future trends facing the Air Force targeting community. With all of the 
previous trends beginning to influence current conflicts, how is the Air Force 
preparing itself to meet these demands? The following section is an attempt to 
outline what I feel is required to not only repair the current targeting deficiencies, 
but to better prepare and shape targeting for years to come. The ideas that I 
present are meant to be more than just suggestive. However, I make no attempt 
to get into a detailed analysis of the how to’s. Rather, this is a conceptual sketch. 
These ideas range from a grandiose, un-restricted creation of a separate 
targeting career field to a lesser scale solution that examines the re-structuring of 
targeting given current constraints. 
1. Separate Targeting Career Field 
The creation of a separate targeting career field has been touted and 
argued for since Major Hansell’s Committee of Operational Analysis during World 
War II.  As previously addressed, one of the key factors concerning the role of 
targeting in the past was not the need for targeting, but rather where targeting 
66 
would be placed within the Air Force’s bureaucratic structure. Targeting is a 
process that I have shown falls between the two diverse cultures of Operations 
and Intelligence, and should actually be thought of as a separate discipline that 
constitutes a merger of these along with many others. From one perspective, 
operational and strategic targeting are not substantial producers of intelligence, 
but rather consumers of vast amounts of all-source intelligence information, and 
therefore to be supported by intelligence analysis rather than the reverse. At the 
same time, targeting is not strictly an intelligence specialty. Targeting as a 
discipline is both a science and an art.  It is practiced by professionals highly 
trained and educated in airpower strategy, interpretive analysis, quantitative 
(statistical and probability) analysis, the capabilities of intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, command and control doctrine and systems, 
weapons capabilities and effects, and air-to-ground tactics.  A targeting officer 
must possess a balanced mix of air-to-ground flying operations, weapons system 
capabilities, intelligence capabilities, and AOC operations. In general, the only 
way one can gain these experiences is to be a rated officer, or an intelligence 
officer who has operational experience working in an air-to-ground wing and an 
Air Operations Center.  As I have previously argued, the targeting process and 
targeting personnel are essential components to the successful application of air 
operations, and the US Air Force can not effectively conduct offensive air ops 
without them. 
The solution to the targeting dilemma in 1974 was to place the 
responsibility for targeting within Air Force intelligence in order to ensure access 
to the intelligence needed to effectively perform targeting. I presume that had the 
targeting process and responsibility not been in the intelligence domain we 
wouldn’t have some of the problems that currently exist within Air Force 
targeting: namely, no doctrine, no core expertise, no AFSC, no advocate and, 
worse, no credibility. Unfortunately, intelligence did a disservice to itself and the 
US Air Force when it lost focus of, and abandoned, targeting as a central concept 
in an effort to consolidate personnel and resources during the 1990’s. The 
decision to place targeting within intelligence in 1974 was done with the idea of 
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establishing a strong foothold in the “green door” of the secretive intelligence 
community. Almost 30 years later, the two worlds of operations and intelligence 
have become more accessible and the ability to gain access to the information 
needed to perform targeting is less restricted than it once was. With the recent 
lack of commitment given to the targeting process by Air Force intelligence and 
the growing relationship between the worlds of operations and intelligence, 
maybe it is time to look back to 1974 and determine whether the environment 
today isn’t more conducive to establishing a separate targeting AFSC than it was 
thirty years ago. Clearly, I think this is not only appropriate, but long overdue. 
In addition, I believe that this separate targeting AFSC should be treated 
as a separate non-rated AFSC similar to those AFSCs of Combat Control / 
Combat Rescue, Airfield Operations, Space and Missile, and Weather, but not 
left solely under the influence of the intelligence community.  I believe that a 
separate AFSC would create an atmosphere that would emphasize proficiency 
and experience. Had the targeting career field been a separate non-rated ops 
AFSC from the beginning, this thesis would not be needed, and the US Air Force 
would have retained the officers and expertise that actually made the US Air 
Force the power that it is.  Having a separate targeting AFSC would provide 
targeting an advocate on the Air Staff somewhere beneath the Director of 
Operations. There would likely be doctrine for targeting developed. And there 
would be a formal educational and training system that specifically catered to the 
long-term development of the targeting profession. In addition, there would be a 
personnel and resource management hierarchy run by those within this new 
AFSC who would have to live with the ramifications of their decisions. Having a 
separate targeting AFSC would not only allow individuals from many disciplines 
to come together and leverage one another’s capabilities, but imagine an AFSC 
that was a collective of former operators, intelligence professionals, command 
and control experts, operational planners, and information operators: a targeting 
officer would be viewed as someone who had a broad perspective of air and 
information operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, and be 
instrumental in the planning and execution of air power.  
68 
2. Re-Structuring of Air Force Intelligence into Broad Tracks 
While creating a separate targeting AFSC may be the preferred path to 
establish a highly professionalized and knowledgeable body of targeting 
specialists integrated throughout the force, it is the rockiest to pursue given the 
challenges involved with creating and maintaining a separate personnel process. 
While not as dramatic and comprehensive as a dedicated targeting AFSC, a 
realigned and reprioritized, properly managed intelligence community could 
create and maintain an effective pool of Air Force intelligence personnel with 
targeting backgrounds. In the period between 1992 and 1998, the Air Force 
intelligence community was divided into three diverse career tracks that each 
catered to a particular area of intelligence. While one path focused primarily on 
the tasking, processing, and collection of intelligence, the other career path took 
this intelligence and converted it into consumable products for Air Force 
operations. This three-pronged career track offered enough latitude for career 
diversification that it allowed those within to become somewhat proficient in the 
required tasks. Due in large part to the combination of ineffective management of 
these tracks, plus the manipulation of the system by some individuals, over time 
personnel came to be misused within their respective branches, and when the 
time came for promotion there appeared to be too much stagnation and 
specialization, causing many to be passed over for promotion. This eventually led 
to the consolidation of the three separate tracks into one, and the increased 
involvement and career management from commanders and the personnel 
system to ensure that officers would become more diverse in all areas of 
intelligence and, in turn, better suited for promotions. This mentality, as 
previously described in Chapter IV, created an intelligence officer who has 
become a generalist, and worse, it has increased the level of careerism overall 
within the ranks. While I personally resent the current level of career 
management within the Air Force intelligence community, I believe that if this had 
been handled differently (within the individual diverse career track), it could have 
eliminated some of the severe “stove piping” or specialization that occurred. 
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My second proposal for how to repair the damage done to the targeting 
disciplines requires re-dividing Air Force intelligence based on the recently 
revitalized intelligence core competencies. These core competencies include 
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Operational Analysis, Air Operation 
Center and Unit Operations and Targeting Operations. For each track, a 
personnel development team will work through each individual’s experience, 
skills, and desires to ensure that Air Force intelligence has the right mix of 
officers to meet mission needs. If properly managed, a track system could be 
broad enough to allow for greater diversity in the officer corps and allow a greater 
degree of specialization that is not possible today. A track system would allow a 
degree of horizontal flexibility without having to turn personnel 180 degrees after 
every assignment. As far as career depth and broadening, if the career tracks are 
managed properly then personnel should come to expect standard rotations 
outside of their given track, such as education and training opportunities as both 
student and instructor, and assignments to various staff level positions 
throughout the various levels of command. The success of a divided intelligence 
career field would depend on the ability of senior intelligence personnel in the 
field to adequately outline detailed requirements to the various personnel 
development teams.  Without active and thorough coordination between senior 
intelligence personnel in the field and the personnel development team, the 
intelligence officer community’s ability to meet Air Force mission requirements is 
greatly reduced. It is my opinion that if a track system was established and 
properly managed by a development team, then a climate could be created in 
which a certain degree of specialization and experience would be developed 
while still being able to flow personnel through various career development and 
educational opportunities.  
The development of a separate career track specializing in targeting would 
generate intelligence officers who could spend more time within targeting and 
those disciplines that parallel targeting, or even support targeting. A simple 
division of the intelligence community, however, will not address all of the 
concerns raised in this thesis. There are lingering issues that need to be 
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addressed, such as how to better train and equip those personnel serving in this 
targeting track to better face the targeting challenges ahead. Also, how can we 
retain those with experience versus eliminating them from the career field? While 
a separate targeting track may be a great start to replenishing those targeting 
skills previously squandered by the Air Force intelligence community, much more 
work will be required to ensure that these targeting specialists residing within 
these billets have the overarching support from not only the intelligence 
community, but the Air Force as a whole.  
D. CONCLUSION  
The problem with targeting today is that the technologies and expectations 
imposed by modern warfare demand far more finesse from the targeting process 
than most of those currently practicing are prepared to provide. Today’s 
targeteers are handicapped by the system that is supposed to provide them the 
skills needed to effectively perform their duties. This chapter makes the relatively 
safe prediction that combat operations of tomorrow will require targeteers to rely 
more than ever on the knowledge and wisdom that they have acquired by their 
years of experience on the job. The problem, however, is that there is no 
architecture currently in place to create a long-lasting, stable environment within 
which targeteers can acquire this knowledge, let alone be able to act upon it. The 
second half of this chapter offered some suggestions for how the US Air Force 
should restructure Air Force targeting in order to create the type of force needed 
to confront the challenges that lie ahead. The first proposal, while the most 
drastic, would require a complete cultural change and creation of an all new 
personnel process. While a dramatic undertaking, this would result in a highly 
professionalized and knowledgeable body of targeting specialists integrated 
throughout the force, ready at any moment to definitively plan, task, and execute 
air power. The second proposal was the low-cost option that simply re-structures 
and re-prioritizes the Air Force intelligence community’s current stance on 
targeting. While not as dramatic and comprehensive as a dedicated AFSC, the 
realigned intelligence community, if developed and managed properly, could 
create and maintain an effective pool of Air Force intelligence personnel with 
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targeting backgrounds. The evolution of war fighting technologies, the mobile and 
responsive nature of targeting, and the rise in expectations of fighting clean wars 
in the future demands that we cannot do anything short of placing the targeting 
process in the hands of a highly focused, dedicated, and thoroughly specialized 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
If we were to go back far enough in time, targeting began when the first 
hominid decided he could inflict more damage on his prey with a blunt instrument 
than with his bare hands. From that day to the present, the targeting concept has 
continued to evolve as man, warfare, and the tools of warfare have evolved.  In 
the post - World War II era one of the prevailing trends characterizing US military, 
and especially US Air Force operations, has been the heavy emphasis placed on 
overwhelming military strength and technologies. Supported by recent successes 
in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the US now appears to accept superior military 
strength as the standard, relying increasingly on maintaining its edge in having 
the right forces and advanced technologies. Given the current trend towards a 
leaner force structure, the US armed forces are becoming ever dependent upon 
precision munitions as a means to guarantee superior military strength in future 
conflicts. Heavy reliance on such sophisticated weaponry as the joint direct 
attack munitions (JDAM), TLAM, CALCM, and numerous other guided weapons 
during the recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq helps illustrate this. 
However, as accurate as these "smart" weapon systems have become, without 
the benefit of a "smart" targeting process to identify the best means to employ 
these high tech solutions, the tremendous advantages they offer can quickly 
become irrelevant. Targeting is a concept that is inextricably bound to the very 
concept of airpower itself, and as such has existed since the earliest days of 
military aviation. Targeting is the very process that defines airpower. Indeed, 
without a concept of targeting, the concept of airpower loses all meaning. 
Currently, the Air Force lacks an overarching vision as to how the targeting 
process and those who perform this vital military function should fit into the larger 
Air Force architecture. This lack of commitment to the targeting process and 
those that practice targeting negates the enormous advantages of America’s 
sophisticated combat arsenal and, if left uncorrected, offset the advantages of 
the precision and technology upon which so much depends. In this thesis I have 
attempted to demonstrate those deficiencies that I believe exist in the Air Force’s 
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handling of the targeting process and those who have been entrusted to perform 
this vital military function. This lack of commitment to the targeting process and 
those who practice targeting negate the enormous advantages made possible by 
prudent use of America’s sophisticated combat arsenal. If left uncorrected, these 
deficiencies promise to jeopardize the overwhelming military advantage that has 
attended virtually every US military operation since World War II. 
The goal of this thesis was to first and foremost establish the relevance of 
the targeting process and the need for the Air Force to invest more time and 
energy into this critical process. No other discipline in the Air Force has such an 
impact on the application of airpower. I also wanted to show that the Air Force at 
various times throughout its short history has recognized the criticality of the 
targeting discipline, to the point that at various times separate organizational 
institutions were established to solely address targeting issues. However, in 
contrast to creating these separate targeting organizations, the Air Force also 
eliminated these targeting organizations in times of peace when it was believed 
targeting was no longer needed. This rationale should have been proved hollow 
numerous times, when ever the Air Force found itself suddenly engaged with an 
enemy with no targeting knowledge or apparatus in place. This lack of a 
persistent targeting organization led to the need to create a targeting specialist 
after the Vietnam War. While this represented a valiant attempt to get Air Force 
targeting back up to speed, the organization that oversaw targeting eventually 
lost sight of the utility targeting provides and eventually so subsumed targeting 
that it is barely existent today.  
The US Air Force fails to understand that targeting is a process that 
ultimately rests on wisdom, not textbook knowledge and information.  We have 
failed to understand that making targeteers is not a matter of training according 
to a checklist, but rather requires educating people how to think. It is not the 
steps of the targeting cycle one needs to learn, but rather the process of 
reasoning by which you engage and work through this cycle. In addition to an 
inadequate education system, the US Air Force has a personnel management 
system that is fundamentally incapable of nurturing the type of targeting talent 
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needed for the long term. At its very core it presumes that every officer aspires to 
rise to great rank, thus completely ignoring the fact that people come into the Air 
Force and remain in for numerous reasons besides that of achieving the next 
rank. The Air Force discounts the notion that the prospect of a lifelong pursuit of 
competence in a chosen discipline is, for some, the highest form of reward. As a 
result, the personnel system embraces an “up-or-out” approach to career 
progression that virtually ignores the intricacies of the technologies and 
experiences needed for modern warfare. Officers move up the ranks at such an 
accelerated pace that they no longer have the ability to become proficient at the 
tasks they are supposed to be fulfilling. The US Air Force’s obsession with 
precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and real time information systems 
had made us forget about those who are responsible for employing and 
maintaining these favored technologies. A revolution in military affairs is not 
necessarily synonymous with rapid development of new capabilities. Revolutions 
in military affairs also stem from revolutions in how we address cultural and 
doctrinal change. The reliance on technology is seen as a substitute for the 
professional. For instance, the belief that machines fight wars and people are 
secondary in importance led us down the path of treating humans in a 
mechanistic manner beginning a century ago. But treating people as nothing 
more than cogs in a machine means they are bound to respond mechanistically, 
not creatively or dynamically. Worse, such an industrial age mindset only 
impedes flexibility and prevents ingenuity, restraining initiative from the numerous 
bright and talented thinkers residing in the lower levels. 
Luckily for the Air Force, there are many extremely talented and hard 
working individuals currently serving in numerous targeting billets scattered 
throughout the Air Force intelligence community. These 18-28 year old soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen have the potential to have a major impact on the outcome of 
airpower and the overall course of military operations. With the importance that 
targeting has on the outcome of airpower, it would only stand to reason that the 
Air Force should make whatever reforms necessary to ensure these individuals 
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